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Abstract
In any setting in which observable properties have a quantitative flavour, it is natural
to compare computational objects by way of metrics rather than equivalences or partial
orders. This holds, in particular, for probabilistic higher-order programs. A natural notion of
comparison, then, becomes context distance, the metric analogue of Morris’ context equiva-
lence. In this paper, we analyze the main properties of the context distance in fully-fledged
probabilistic λ-calculi, this way going beyond the state of the art, in which only affine calculi
were considered. We first of all study to which extent the context distance trivializes, giving
a sufficient condition for trivialization. We then characterize context distance by way of a
coinductively defined, tuple-based notion of distance in one of those calculi, called Λ⊕! . We
finally derive pseudometrics for call-by-name and call-by-value probabilistic λ-calculi, and
prove them fully-abstract.
1 Introduction
Probability theory offers computer science models which enable system abstraction (at the price of
introducing uncertainty), but which can also be seen as a a way to compute, like in randomized
computation. Domains in which probabilistic models play a key role include machine learning [28],
robotics [35], and linguistics [25]. In cryptography, on the other hand, having access to a source of
uniform randomness is essential to achieve security, e.g., in the public key setting [20]. This has
stimulated the development of concrete and abstract programming languages, which most often
are extensions of their deterministic siblings. Among the many ways probabilistic choice can be
captured in programming, the simplest one consists in endowing the language of programs with
an operator modelling the flipping of a fair coin. This renders program evaluation a probabilistic
process, and under mild assumptions the language becomes universal for probabilistic computation.
Particularly fruitful in this sense has been the line of work on the functional paradigm, both at a
theoretical [22, 30, 27] and at a more practical level [21].
We are still far, however, from a satisfactory understanding of higher-order probabilistic
computation. As an example, little is known about how much of the classic, beautiful, theory
underlying the λ-calculus [1] can be lifted to probabilistic λ-calculi, although the latter have been
known from forty years now [31]. Until the beginning of this decade, indeed, most investigations
were directed towards domain theory, which has been proved to be much more involved in presence
of probabilistic choice than in a deterministic scenario [23]. In the last ten years, however, some
promising results have appeared. As an example, both quantitative semantics and applicative
bisimilarity have been shown to coincide with context equivalence for certain kinds of probabilistic
λ-calculi [14, 5]. This not only provides us with new proof methodologies for program equivalence,
but also sheds new light on the very nature of probabilistic higher-order computation. As an
example, recent results tell us that program equivalence in presence of probabilistic choice lies
somehow in between determinism and non-determinism [5].
But are equivalences the most proper way to compare terms? Actually, this really depends on
what the underlying observable is. If observables are boolean, then equivalences (and preorders) are
indeed natural choices: two programs are dubbed equivalent if they give rise to the same observable
1
ar
X
iv
:1
70
1.
05
52
1v
1 
 [c
s.L
O]
  1
9 J
an
 20
17
(of which there are just two!) in any context. If, on the other hand, the observable is an element of
a metric space, which happens for example when we observe (the probability of) convergence in a
probabilistic setting, one may wonder whether replacing equivalences with metrics makes sense.
This is a question that has recently been given a positive answer in the affine setting [7], i.e., in a
λ-calculus in which copying is simply not available. More specifically, a notion of context distance
has been shown to model differences between terms satisfactorily, and has also been shown to
be characterized by notions of trace metrics, and to be approximated from below by behavioural
metrics.
Affine λ-calculi are very poor in terms of the computations they are able to model. Measuring
the distance between terms in presence of copying, however, is bound to be problematic. On
the one hand, allowing contexts to copy their argument has the potential risk of trivialising the
underlying metric. On the other hand, finding handier characterizations of the obtained notion of
metric in the style of behavioural or trace metrics is inherently hard. A more thorough discussion
on these issues can be found in Section 2 below.
In this paper, we attack the problem of analyzing the distance between λ-terms in its full
generality. More specifically, the contributions of this paper are fourfold:
• First of all, we define a linear probabilistic λ-calculus, called Λ!,‖⊕ , in which copying and a
nonstandard construct, namely Plotkin’s parallel disjunction, are both available. A very liberal
type system prevents deadlocks, but nevertheless leaves the expressive power of the calculus
very high. This choice has been motivated by our will to put ourselves in the most general
setting, so as to be able to talk about different fragments. The calculus is endowed with a
notion of context distance, in Morris’ style. This is covered in Section 3 below.
• We study trivialization of the obtained notion(s) of metric for different fragments of Λ!,‖⊕ ,
showing that both parallel disjunction and strong normalization give us precisely the kind
of discriminating power we need to arbitrarily amplify distances, while in the most natural
fragment, namely Λ!⊕, trivialization does not hold. This is the subject of Section 4.
• In Section 5, we prove that context distance can be characterized as a coinductively defined
distance on a labelled Markov chain of tuples. The way (tuples of) terms interact with their
environment makes proofs of soundness laborious and different from their affine counterparts
from [7]. An up-to-context notion of bisimulation is proved to be sound, and to be quite useful
when evaluating the distance between concrete programs.
• Finally, we show that the results from Section 5 can be lifted back to ordinary probabilistic
λ-calculi from the literature [10, 5]. Both when call-by-name evaluation and call-by-value are
considered, our framework can be naturally adapted, and helps in facilitating concrete proofs.
This is in Section 6.
2 Metrics and Trivialisation, Informally
The easiest way to render the pure λ-calculus a universal probabilistic computation model [10]
consists in endowing it with a binary construct ⊕ for probabilistic choice. The term M ⊕N evolves
as either M or N , each with probability 12 . The obtained calculus can be given meaning by an
operational semantics which puts terms in correspondence with distributions of values. The natural
notion of observation, at least in an untyped setting like the one we will consider in this paper, is
thus the probability of convergence of the observed term M , which will be denoted as
∑JMK. One
could then define a notion of context equivalence following Morris’ pattern, and stipulate that two
terms M and N should be equivalent whenever they terminate with exactly the same probability
when put in any context:
M ≡ N ⇔ ∀C.
∑
JC[M ]K =
∑
JC[N ]K.
The anatomy of the obtained notion of equivalence has been recently studied extensively, the
by-products of this study being powerful techniques for it in the style of bisimilarity and logical
relations [24, 5, 3].
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As observed by various authors (see, e.g., [26] for a nice account), probabilistic programs and
processes are naturally compared by metrics rather than equivalences: the latter do not give any
quantitative information about how different two non-equivalent programs are. Given that the
underlying notion of observation is inherently quantitative, on the other hand, generalizing context
equivalence to a pseudometric turns out to be relatively simple:
δ(M,N) = sup
C
∣∣∣∣∑JC[M ]K −∑JC[N ]K
∣∣∣∣ .
Observe that the obtained notion of context distance between two terms is a real number between
0 and 1, which is minimal precisely when the considered terms are context equivalent. It is the
least discriminating pseudometric which is non-expansive and adequate, and as such it provides
some quite precise information about how far the two argument programs are, observationally. A
similar notion has recently been studied by the authors [7], but only in a purely affine setting.
Let us now consider two prototypical examples of non-equivalent terms, namely I = λx.x
(the identity) and Ω (the always-divergent term). The context distance δc(I,Ω) between them
is maximal: when applied, e.g., to the trivial context [·], they converge with probability 1 and 0,
respectively. A term which is conceptually “in the middle” of them is M = I ⊕ Ω. Indeed, in a
purely affine λ-calculus, δc(I,M) = δc(M,Ω) = 12 .
If we render the three terms duplicable (by putting them in the scope of a !-operator), however,
the situation becomes much more complicated. Consider the terms !I and !(I ⊕ Ω). One can
easily define a family of contexts {Cn}n∈N such that the probability of convergence of Cn[!I] and
Cn[!(I ⊕ Ω)] tend to 1 and 0 (respectively) when n tends to infinity. It suffices to take Cn as
(λ!x. x . . . x︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
)[·]. Allowing contexts to have the capability to duplicate their argument seems to
mean that they can arbitrarily amplify distances. Indeed, the argument above also works when
(I ⊕ Ω) is replaced by any term which behaves as Ω with probability ε and as I with probability
1− ε, provided of course ε > 0. But how about !Ω and !(I ⊕Ω)? Are they at maximal distance, i.e.
is it that δc(!Ω, !(I ⊕Ω)) = 1? Apparently, this is not the case. The previously defined contexts Cn
cannot amplify the “linear” distance between the two terms above, namely 12 , up to 1. But what is
the distance between !Ω and !(I ⊕ Ω), then? Evaluating it is hard, since you need to consider all
contexts, which do not have a nice structure. In Section 5, we will introduce a different, better
behaved, notion of distance, this way being able to prove that, indeed, δc(!Ω, !(I ⊕ Ω)) = 12 .
All this hints at even more difficult examples, like the one in which Mε =!(Ω⊕ε I), where ⊕ε is
the natural generalization of ⊕ to a possibly unfair coin flip, and one is interested in evaluating
δc(Mε,Mµ). In that case, we can easily see that the ”linear” distance between them is |ε− µ|. In
some cases, it is possible to amplify it: the most natural way is again to consider the contexts Cn
defined above. Indeed, we see that the probabilities of convergence of Cn[M ] and Cn[N ] are ε
n and
µn, respectively. It follows that δc(Mε,Mµ) ≥ supn∈N |εn − µn|. For some ε and µ (for example if
ε+ µ > 1), the context distance can be greater than |ε− µ|. But there is no easy way to know how
far amplification can lead us. The terms Mε and Mµ will be running examples in the course of
this paper. Despite their simplicity, evaluating the distance between them is quite challenging.
We are also going to consider the case where contexts can evaluate terms in parallel, converging
if and only if at least one of the copies converges. This behaviour is not expressible in the
usual λ-calculus, but is captured by well-known constructs and in particular by Plotkin’s parallel
disjunction [29]. In Section 4 below, we prove that all this is not accidental: the presence of parallel
disjunction turns a non-trivialising metric into a trivialising one. The proof of it, by the way, relies
on building certain amplifying contexts which are then shown to be universal using tools from
functional analysis.
3 A Linear Probabilistic λ-Calculus
In this section, we present the syntax and operational semantics of our language Λ
!,‖
⊕ , on which we
will later define metrics. Λ
!,‖
⊕ is a probabilistic and linear λ-calculus, designed not only to allow
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copying, but to have a better control on it. It is based on a probabilistic variation of the calculus
defined in [34], whose main feature is to never reduce inside exponential boxes. As we will see in
Section 6, the calculus is capable of encoding both call-by-value and call-by-name fully-fledged
probabilistic λ-calculi. We add a parallel disjunction construct to the calculus, being inspired by
Plotkin’s parallel disjunction [29]. Noticeably, it has been recently shown [8] that adding parallel
disjunction to a (non-linear) λ-calculus increases the expressive power of contexts to the point of
enabling coincidence between the contextual preorder and applicative similarity. The choice of
studying a very general calculus is motivated by our desire to be as general as possible. This being
said, many of our results hold only in absence of parallel disjunction.
Definition 1 We assume a countable set of variables X . The set of terms of Λ
!,‖
⊕ (denoted T )
is defined by the following grammar:
M ∈ T ::= x | MM | λx.M | λ!x.M | !M | M ⊕ M | ([M ‖M ]M) ,
where x ∈ X . The fragment of Λ!,‖⊕ without the ([· ‖ ·] ·) construct will be indicated as Λ!⊕.
Values are those terms derived from the following grammar:
V ∈ V ::= λx.M | λ!x.M | !M.
As already mentioned, M ⊕ N can evolve to either M or N , each with probability 12 . The
term !M is a duplicable version of M , often called an (exponential) box. We have two distinct
abstraction operators: λx.M is a linear abstraction, while the non-linear abstraction λ!x.M
requires exponential boxes as arguments. The term ([M ‖ N ] L) behaves as L if either M or
N converges. Please observe that both abstractions and boxes are values—our notion of reduction
is weak and surface [34].
We are now going to define an operational semantics for the closed terms of Λ
!,‖
⊕ in a way
similar to the one developed for a (non-linear) λ-calculus in [10]. We need to first define a family of
approximation semantics, and then to take the semantics of a term as the least upper bound of all
its approximations. The approximation semantics relation is denoted M ⇒ D, where M is a closed
term of Λ
!,‖
⊕ , and D is a (sub)distribution on values with finite support, i.e., a function from V to
R[0,1] which sums to a real number
∑
D ≤ 1. For any distribution D on a set X, we call support of
D, and we note S(D), the set {x ∈ X | D(x) > 0}. We say that D is finite if S(D) is a finite set.
The rules deriving the approximation semantics relation are given in Figure 1, and are based on
the notion of an evaluation context, which is an expression generated from the following grammar:
E ::= [·] | EV | ME | ([M ‖ E] N) | ([E ‖M ] N) .
As usual, E[M ] stands for the term obtained by filling the sole occurrence of [·] in E with M .
In Figure 1 and elsewhere in this paper, we indicate the distribution assigning probability pi to
Vi for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} as {V p11 , . . . , V pnn }. Similarly for the expression {V pii }i∈I , where I is
any countable index set. Observe how we first define a one-step reduction relation · → · between
closed terms and sequences of terms, only later extending it to a small-step reduction relation
· ⇒ · between closed terms and distributions on values. A reduction step can be a linear or
non-linear β-reduction, or a probabilistic choice. Moreover, there can be more than one active
redex in any closed term M , due to the presence of parallel disjunction. For any term M , the set of
sub-distributions D such that M ⇒ D is a countable directed set. Since the set of sub-distributions
(with potentially infinite support) is an ω-complete partial order, we can define the semantics of
a term M as JMK = sup{D | M ⇒ D}. We could also define alternatively a big-step semantics,
again in the same way as that of the probabilistic λ-calculus considered in [10].
Not all irreducible terms are values in Λ
!,‖
⊕ , e.g. (λ!x.x)(λx.x). We thus need a type-system
which guarantees the absence of deadlocks. Since we want to be as general as possible, we
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M ⊕ N ↪→M,N (λx.M)V ↪→M{x/V } (λ!x.M)!N ↪→M{x/N}
([V ‖M ] N) ↪→ N ([M ‖ V ] N) ↪→ N
M ↪→ N1, . . . , Nn
E[M ]→ E[N1], . . . E[Nn]
V ⇒ {V 1} M ⇒ ∅
M → N1, . . . , Nn (Ni ⇒ Di)1≤i≤n
M ⇒∑1≤i≤n 1n · Di
Figure 1: Approximation Semantics for Λ!⊕
consider recursive types as formulated in [2], which are expressive enough to type the image of the
embeddings we will study in Section 6. The grammar of types is the following:
σ ∈ A ::= α | µα.σ( σ | µα.!σ | σ( σ | !σ
Types are defined up to the equality =A , defined in Figure 2. σ[α→ τ ] stands for the type obtained
by substituting all free occurrences of α by τ in σ. An environment is a set of expressions in the
µα.σ( τ =A σ[α→ (µα.σ( τ)]( τ [α→ (µα.σ( τ)]
µα.!σ =A !(σ[α→ µα.!σ])
σ =A γ[α→ σ] τ =A γ[α→ τ ]
σ =A τ
Figure 2: Equality of Types
form x : σ or !x :!σ in which any variable occurs at most once. Environments are often indicated
with metavariables like !Γ, which stands for an environment in which all variables occur as !x, or
∆ in which, on the contrary, only variables can occur, i.e. ∆ is of the form x1 : σ1, . . . , xn : σn.
Typing judgments are thus of the form !Γ,∆ `M : σ. The typing system is given in Figure 3. The
role of this type system is not to guarantee termination, but rather to guarantee a form of type
soundness:
Lemma 1 If ` M : σ and M ⇒ D, then ` V : σ for every V in the support of D. Moreover, if
`M : σ and M is irreducible (i.e. M 6↪→ N for every N), then M is value.
Example 1 The term I = λx.x can be typed as ` I : σ( σ for every σ ∈ A . We define Ω! to be
the term (λ!x.x!x)(!(λ!x.x!x)), which is the counterpart in our linear calculus of the prototypical
!Γ, !x :!σ ` x : σ !Γ, x : σ ` x : σ
!Γ, x : σ,∆ `M : τ
!Γ,∆ ` λx.M : σ( τ
!x : σ, !Γ,∆ `M : τ
!Γ,∆ ` λ!x.M : σ( τ
!Γ,∆ `M : σ( τ !Γ,Θ ` N : σ
!Γ,∆,Θ `MN : τ
!Γ `M : σ
!Γ `!M :!σ
!Γ,∆ `M : σ !Γ,∆ ` N : σ
!Γ,∆ `M ⊕ N : σ
!Γ,∆ `M : σ !Γ,Θ ` N : σ !Γ,Ξ ` L : τ
!Γ,∆,Θ,Ξ ` ([M ‖ N ] L) : τ
Figure 3: Typing Rules
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diverging term of the λ-calculus, namely Ω = (λx.xx)(λx.xx). We can type this divergent term
with any possible type: indeed, if we take τ ::= µα.!α( σ, then τ =A !τ ( σ and ` λ!x.x!x : σ.
Using that, we can see that ` Ω! : σ for every type σ. We will see in Section 6 that, more
generally, there are several ways to turn any pure λ-term M into a Λ!⊕ term in such a way as to
obtain meaningful typing and semantics: Λ!⊕ is actually at least as powerful as the usual untyped
probabilistic λ-calculus [10].
Termination could in principle be guaranteed if one considers strictly positive types, as we will do
in Section 4.1 below. Let D be the set of dyadic numbers (i.e. those rational numbers in the form
n
2m (with n,m ∈ N and n ≤ 2m). It is easy to derive, for every ε ∈ D, a new binary operator on
terms · ⊕ε · such that JM ⊕ε NK = (1− ε)JMK + εJNK for every closed M,N . It can be defined,
e.g., as follows by induction on m:
M ⊕0 N = M
M ⊕1 N = N
M ⊕ n2m N =
{
M ⊕ (M ⊕ n2m−1 N) if n ≤ 2m−1
N ⊕ (M ⊕n−2
m−1
2m−1 N) if n > 2m−1
Example 2 We define here a family of terms that we use as a running example. We consider
terms of the form Mε =!(Ω! ⊕ε I), for ε ∈ D. It holds that ` Mε :!(σ( σ) for every σ. Mε
corresponds to a duplicable term each copy of which behaves as I with probability ε, and does not
terminate with probability 1− ε.
3.1 Some Useful Terminology and Notation
In this paper, we will make heavy use of sequences of terms and types. It is thus convenient to
introduce some terminology and notation about them.
A finite (ordered) sequence whose elements are e1, . . . , en will be indicated as e = [e1, . . . , en],
and called an n-sequence. Metavariables for sequences are boldface variations of the metavariables
for their elements. Whenever E = {i1, . . . , im} ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and i1 < . . . < im, the sub-sequence
[ei1 , . . . , eim ] of an n-sequence e will be indicated as eE . If the above holds, E will be called an
n-set. If e is an n-sequence, and ϕ is a permutation on {1, . . . , n}, we note eϕ the n-sequence
[eϕ(1), . . . , eϕ(n)]. We can turn an n-sequence into a (n + 1)-sequence by adding an element at
the end: this is the role of the semicolor operator. We denote by [en] the n-sequence where all
components are equal to e.
Whenever this does not cause ambiguity, notations like the ones above will be used in conjunction
with syntactic constructions. For example, if σ is an n-sequence of types, then !σ stands for the
sequence [!σ1, . . . , !σn]. As another example, if σ is an n-sequence of types and E is an n-set, then
xE : σE stands for the environment assigning type σi to xi for every i ∈ E. As a final example,
if M is an n-sequence of terms and σ is an n-sequence of types, `M : σ holds iff ` Mi : σi is
provable for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
3.2 Context Distance
A context of type σ for terms of type τ is a term C which can be typed as hole : τ ` C : σ, where
hole is a distinguished variable. Cτσ collects all such terms. If C ∈ Cτσ and M is a closed term of
type τ , then the closed term C{hole/M} has type σ and is often indicated as C[M ].
The context distance [7] is the natural quantitative refinement of context equivalence. Intuitively,
it corresponds to the maximum separation that contexts can induce between two terms. Following
[7], we take as observable the probability of convergence: for any term M , we define its observable
Obs(M) as
∑JMK. Then, for any terms M , N such that `M : σ and ` N : σ, we define:
δcσ,!,‖(M,N) = sup
C∈Cτσ
|Obs(C[M ])−Obs(C[N ])|.
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Please observe that this distance is a pseudometric, and that moreover we can recover context
equivalence by considering its kernel, that is the set of pairs of terms which are at distance 0. The
binary operator δcσ,! is defined similarly, but referring to terms (and contexts) from Λ
!
⊕.
Example 3 What can we say about δcσ,!,‖(Mε,Mµ)? Not much apparently, since all contexts should
be considered. Even if we put ourselves in the fragment Λ!⊕, the best we can do is to conclude that
δcσ,!(M,N) ≥ supn∈N|εn − µn|, as explained in Section 2.
4 On Trivialisation
As we have already mentioned, there can well be classes of terms such that the context distance
collapses to context equivalence, due to the copying abilities of the language. The question of
trivialisation can in fact be seen as a question about the expressive power of contexts: given
two duplicable terms, how much can a context amplify the observable differences between their
behaviours?
More precisely, we would like to identify trivialising fragments of Λ
!,‖
⊕ , that is to say fragments
such that for any pair of duplicable terms, their context distance (with respect to the fragment) is
either 0 or 1. This is not the case in Λ!⊕ (see Example 9 below).
In fact, a sufficient condition to trivialization is to require the existence of amplification contexts :
for every observable type σ, for every α, β ∈ [0, 1] distinct, for every γ > 0, we want to have a
context Cα,β,γσ such that:
`M,N : σ
Obs(M) = α
Obs(N) = β
⇒ ∣∣Obs(Cα,β,γσ [!M ])−Obs(Cα,β,γσ [!N ])∣∣ ≥ 1− γ.
Fact 1 Any fragment of Λ
!,‖
⊕ admitting all amplifications contexts trivializes.
4.1 Strictly Positive Types
First, let us consider the case of the fragment Λ!,↓⊕ of Λ
!
⊕ obtained by considering strictly positive
types, only (in a similar way to [2]), and by dropping parallel disjunction. Every term M of Λ!,↓⊕ is
terminating (i.e.
∑JMK = 1), so we need to adapt our notion of observation: we define the type
B =!α(!α( α, which can be seen as boolean type using a variant of the usual boolean encoding
in λ-calculi. Our new notion of observation, defined only at type B, is Obs(M) =
∑JM !I!Ω!K, which
corresponds to the probability that M evaluates to true. While this notion of observation uses the
full power of Λ!⊕, the context distance δ
c
!,↓ based on it only consider contexts in Λ
!,↓
⊕ .
Theorem 1 δc!,↓ trivialises.
The proof of Theorem 1 is based on the construction of amplification contexts. We are going to use
Bernstein constructive proof of the Stone-Weierstrass theorem. Indeed, Bernstein showed that for
every continuous function f : [0, 1]→ R, the following sequence of polynomials converges uniformly
towards f :
P fn (x) =
∑
0≤k≤n f
(
k
n
)
·Bnk (x), where Bnk (x) =
(n
k
)
· xk · (1− x)n−k.
Let us consider the following continuous function: we fix f(α) = 0, f(β) = 1, and f defined
elsewhere in such a way that it is continuous, that it has values in [0, 1], and that moreover
f(Q) ⊆ Q. We can easily implement P fn by a context, i.e. define C such that for every M ,
Obs(C[M ]) = P fn (Obs(M)). In Λ
!,↓
⊕ , we can indeed copy an argument n times, then evaluate it,
and then for every k between 0 and n, if the number of trues obtained is exactly k, return the
term false⊕f( kn ) true (that corresponds to a term returning true with probability f ( kn)). Please
observe that this construction works only because in Λ!,↓⊕ all terms converge with probability 1.
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4.2 Parallel Disjunction
As we have seen, trivialization can be enforced by restricting the class of terms, but we can also
take the opposite road, namely increasing the discriminating power of contexts. Indeed, consider
the full language Λ
!,‖
⊕ , with the usual notion of observation.
We can first see how parallel disjunction increases the expressive power of the calculus on a simple
example. Consider the following two terms: M =!Ω! and N =!(Ω! ⊕ I). We will see later that
these two terms are the simplest example of non-trivialization in Λ!⊕: indeed δ
c
!(τ(τ),!(M,N) =
1
2 ,
while δc!(τ(τ),!,‖(M,N) = 1. In Λ
!,‖
⊕ , we are able to define a family of contexts (Cn)n∈N as follows:
Cn = (λ!x. ([x ‖ ([x ‖ . . .] I) ] I) ) [·].
Essentially, Cn makes n copies of its argument, and then converges towards I if at least one
of these copies itself converges. When we apply the context Cn to M and N , we can see that
the convergence probability of Cn[M ] is always 0 independently of n, whereas the convergence
probability of Cn[N ] tends towards 1 when n tends to infinity.
Theorem 2 δc!,‖ trivializes.
The proof is based on the construction of amplification contexts Cα,β,γσ . If max(α, β) = 1, we can
extend the informal argument from Section 2, by taking contexts that copy an arbitrary number
of times their argument. If min(α, β) = 0, we can use the same idea as in the example above, by
taking contexts that do an arbitrary number of disjunctions. What remains to be done to obtain
the trivialization result is treating the case in which 0 < α, β < 1. The overall idea is to somehow
mix the contexts we use in the previous cases. More precisely, we define a family of contexts
(Cmn )n,m∈N as follows:
Cmn = λ!y.
(∧n
(
∨m
(y, . . . , y), . . . ,
∨m
(y, . . . , y))
)
[·]
where ∨n
(M1, . . .Mn) = ([M1 ‖ ([M2 ‖ . . .] I) ] I) ;∧n
(M1 . . .Mn) = (λz1.λz2. . . . λy.(yz1 . . . zn))M1 . . .Mn.
The term
∨n
(M1, . . . ,Mn) behaves as a n-ary disjunction: it terminates if at least one of the Mi
terminates. On the other hand,
∧n
(M1, . . . ,Mn) can be seen as a n-ary conjunction: it terminates
if all the Mi terminates. The contexts C
α
n compute m-ary conjunctions of n-ary disjunction. Now,
let ι be such that α < ι < β. We need to show that for every n, we can choose m(n, ι) ∈ N such
that:
lim
n→∞Obs(C
m(n,ι)
n [!M ]) =
{
1 if Obs(M) > ι;
0 if Obs(M) < ι.
.
We can express this problem purely in terms of functional analysis, by observing that Obs(Cmn [!M ]) =
(1− (1−Obs(M))m)n. We are now going to show the result by applying the dominated convergence
theorem to a well-chosen sequence of functions.
We choose m(n, γ) = dr(n, ι)e, with
r(n, ι) =
(
1
1− ι
)n
.
Now, we see that Obs(C
m(n,ι)
n [!M ]), is equal to fn,ι(Obs(M)), where fn,ι is the real function defined
by:
fn,ι(x) = (1− (1− x)n)dr(n,ι)e
The result we are trying to show can now be expressed by way of the following lemma:
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Lemma 2
lim
n→∞ fn,ι(x) =
{
0 if x < ι
1 if x > ι
Proof. In order to simplify the proof, we show an equivalent result on gn,α(x) = fn,1−α(1− x).
Lemma 2 is equivalent to say that: limn→∞ gn,α(x) =
{
1 if x < α,
0 if x > α.
We express g as an integral,
since we want to use known results about inversion of integral and limits:
gn,α(x) =
{∫ x
0
g′n,α(t)dt+ 1 if x < α
− ∫ 1
x
g′n,α(t)dt if x > α
We can now express our goal using g′: we have to show that
lim
n→∞
∫ x
0
g′n,α(t)dt = 0 and lim
n→∞
∫ 1
x
g′n,α(t)dt = 0.
We first establish a bound on the g′n,α:
g′n,α(x) = −dr(n, 1− α)e · n · (1− xn)dr(n,1−α)e−1 · xn−1
And consequently:
| g′n,α(x) |≤
1
α2
·
(x
α
)n−1
· n · (1− xn)( 1α )n−1 (1)
We have to use the following well-known inequality, that we recall here:
lim
x→∞x
m · e−x = 0 for every m ∈ N. (2)
For every x < α, we’re going to use the bounded convergence theorem, which is a well-known
theorem in real analysis, on [0, x] and on [x, 1] for every x > α . We recall this theorem here:
Theorem 3 (Bounded Convergence Theorem) If kn is a sequence of uniformly bounded real-
valued measurable functions which converges pointwise on a bounded measure space (S,Σ, µ) to a
function k, then the limit k is an integrable function and:
∫
S
limn→∞ kn = limn→∞
∫
S
kn.
• Let’s first take 0 ≤ x < α. Here, we take (S,Σ, µ) as the segment [0, x] with the Lebesgue
measure (corresponding to the usual notion of integration on real functions). We obtain using
(1), that for every t ∈ [0, x], it holds:
| g′n,α(t) |≤ K · n ·
(
t
α
)n−1
where K is a constant. We can already see that g′n,α converge pointwise to the 0-function on
[0, x] (using (2)). We’re now going to show it’s bounded. Using the fact that t ≤ x, we obtain:
| g′n,α(t) | ≤ K · n ·
(x
α
)n−1
≤ K ·max
n∈N
n ·
(x
α
)n−1
Please observe that the max is well-defined and <∞ because the sequence n · ( xα)n−1 has a
finite limit (by (2)). So we have achieved to bound g′n,α(t) by a constant depending neither on
t nor on n. Consequently, we can apply the bounded convergence theorem, and we obtain :
lim
n→∞
∫ x
0
g′n,α(t)dt = 0
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• Now we consider the case where α < x ≤ 1. Here, we take (S,Σ, µ) as the segment [0, x] with
the Lebesgue measure. By using 1, we can see that for every t ∈ [x, 1]:
| g′n,α(t) | ≤
1
α2
·
(
t
α
)n−1
· n · exp
(((
1
α
)n
− 1
)
· (−tn)
)
≤ 1
α2
·
(
t
α
)n−1
· n · exp
(
−
(
t
α
)n)
· exp(tn)
≤ 1
α2
·
(
1
α
)n−1
· n · exp
(
−
(x
α
)n)
· exp(1)
Using 2 (and doing several computation), we can see that for every a, b > 1, it holds that:
lim
m→∞ a
m ·m · exp(−bm) = 0 (3)
By applying this, we obtain:
lim
n→∞
1
α2
·
(
1
α
)n−1
· n · exp
(
−
(x
α
)n)
· exp(1) = 0 (4)
Now, please observe that 4 gives us both the pointwise limit and the uniform bound (since
gn,α(t) is bounded by a sequence that doesn’t depends on t, and has a finite limit when n goes
towards infinity). So we can apply the bounded convergence theorem, and we obtain that:
lim
n→∞
∫ 1
x
g′n,α(t)dt = 0
This concludes the proof 
5 Tuples and Full Abstraction
This section is structured as follows: first, we define a labelled Markov chain (LMC) which expresses
the semantics of our calculus in an interactive way, and then we use it to give a coinductively
defined notion of distance on an LTS of distributions, which coincides with the context distance as
defined in Section 3.2. We are not considering parallel disjunction here: the motivations for that
should be clear from Theorem 2.
5.1 A Labelled Markov Chain over Tuples
Labelled Markov chains are the probabilistic analogues to labelled transition systems. Formally,
a LMC is a triple M = (S,A,P), where S is a countable set of states, A is a countable set of
labels, and P : S ×A → Distr(S) is a transition probability matrix (where Distr(X) is the set of all
distributions over X).
Following [9], the interactive behaviour of probabilistic λ-terms can be represented by an
LMC whose states are the terms of the language, whose actions are values, and where doing the
action V starting from a state M corresponds to applying the value V to M . This approach is
bound not to work in presence of pairs when metrics take the place of equivalences, due to the
unsoundness of projective actions. In [7], this observation lead us to introduce a new LMC whose
states are tuples of terms, and whose actions include one splitting a pair: P([〈M,N〉])(destruct) =
{[M,N ]1}. This turns out to work well in an affine setting [7]. We are going to define a LMC
M !⊕ = (SM !⊕ ,AM !⊕ ,PM !⊕) which is an extension of the one from [7], and which is adapted to a
language with copying capabilities. The idea is to treat exponentials in the spirit of Milner’s Law:
!A( A⊗!A.
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5.1.1 States
Tuples are pairs of the form K = (M ,V ) where M and V are a sequence of terms and values,
respectively. The set of all such tuples is indicated as U . The first component of a tuple is called
its exponential part, while the second one is called its linear part. We write ` (M ,V ) : (σ, τ ) if
`M : σ and ` V : τ . We note T the set of pairs A = (σ, τ ), and we call tuple types the elements
of T. Moreover, we say that (σ, τ ) is a (n,m) tuple type if σ and τ are, respectively, an n-sequence
and an m-sequence. To any term M , we associate a tuple in a natural way: we note M˙ the tuple
([] , [M ]), and similarly if σ is a type, we indicate the tuple type ([] , [σ]) as σ˙. Please observe that
if `M : σ, then it holds that ` M˙ : σ˙.
A sequence of the form (E,F,σ, τ ,M, γ) is said to be an applicative typing judgment when σ
and τ are, respectively, an n-sequence and an m-sequence of types, E and F are respectively an
n-set and an m-set, and moreover it holds that !xE :!σE ,yF : τF `M : γ. Intuitively, this means
that if we have a tuple K = (N ,V ) of type (σ, τ ), we can replace free variables of M by some
of the terms from K. More precisely, we can replace variables in linear position by the Vi with
i ∈ F , and variables in non linear position by Nj , with j ∈ E. We note as M [K] the closed term
of type γ that we obtain this way. We note J the set of all applicative typing judgments. We are
specially interested in those judgments (E,F,σ, τ ,M, γ) in J such that for every tuple K, the
resulting term M [K] is a value: that is when either M = yi for a i ∈ N, or M is of the form λz.N ,
λ!z.N , or !N . We note J V the set of those judgments.
We are now in a position to define M !⊕ formally. The set of its states is indeed defined as
SM !⊕ = {(K,A) | K ∈ U , A ∈ T, ` K : A}.
5.1.2 Labels and Transitions
How do states in SM !⊕ interact with the environment? This is captured by the labels in AM !⊕ , and
the associated probability matrix. We define AM !⊕ as the disjoint union of A?, A! and A@, where:
A! = A? = {i | i ∈ N}; A@ = {(κ, i) | i ∈ N, κ ∈J V }.
In order to distinguish actions in A! and A?, we write the action i ∈ N as (?i) if it comes from A?,
and as (!i) if it comes from A!. The action (κ, i) ∈ A@ is often indicated as @iκ. The probability
matrix PM !⊕ is defined formally in Figure 4. We give below some intuitions about it. The general
idea is that M !⊕ is designed to express every possible effect that a context can have on tuples. A?
and A! are designed to model copying capabilities, while A@ corresponds to applicative interactions.
Actions in A? take any term of the form !M from the linear part of the underlying tuple, unbox
it and transfer M to the exponential part of the tuple. Please observe that this action is in fact
deterministic: the resulting tuple is uniquely determined. Labels in A!, on the other hand, model
the act of copying terms in the exponential part. We call its elements Milner’s actions. More
specifically, the action (!i) takes the i-th term in the exponential part of the tuple, makes a copy of
it, evaluates it and adds the result to the linear part. Please observe that, contrary to (?i), this
action can have a probabilistic outcome: the transferred term is evaluated.
Labels in A@ are analogues of the applicative actions from applicative bisimulation over terms
(see, e.g. [9]). As such, they model environments passing arguments to programs. Here, we have to
adapt this idea to our tuple framework: indeed, we can see the tuple as a collection of programs
available to the environment, who is free to choose with which of the programs to interact with by
passing it an argument. This argument, however, could depend on other components of the tuple,
which need to be removed from it if lying in its linear part. Finally, please observe that all this
should respect types. Labels in A@ are indeed defined as a pair of an index i corresponding to the
position in the tuple of the term the environment chooses, and an applicative typing judgment, used
to specify the argument. Please observe that in the definition of probability matrix for applicative
actions, in Figure 4, the condition on i implies that the i-th linear component of the tuple is not
used to construct the argument term.
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((M ,W ), (σ, τ ))
with τi = γ ( η
((M ,W {1,...,n}\(F∪{i});V ),
(σ, τ {1,...,n}\(F∪{i}); η))
@iκJWi(N [(M ,W )])K(V )
with κ = (E,F,σ, τ , N, γ) and i 6∈ F
((M ,W ), (σ, τ ))
with Wi =!N and τi =!γ
(M ;N,W {1,...,n}\{i}),
(σ; γ, τ {1,...,n}\{i}))
(?i)
1
((M ,W ), (σ, τ )) ((M ,W ;V ), (σ, τ ;σi))
(!i)JMiK(V )
Figure 4: Definition of PM !⊕
(M˙ε, ˙!σ)
([Ω! ⊕ε I] , []),
([σ] , [])
([Ω! ⊕ε I] , [I]),
([σ] , [σ])
([Ω! ⊕ε I] , [I, I]),
([σ] , [σ, σ])
([Ω! ⊕ε I] , [V ]), ([σ] , [τ ])
with ` V : τ
([Ω! ⊕ε I] , [W{x1/Ω! ⊕ε I}]),
([σ] , [τ ])
with !x1 :!σ ` W : τ
1
(?1)
ε
(!1)
ε
(!1)1
@1
(0¯,0¯,[σ],[σ],V,τ)
1
@1
([1],0¯,[σ],[σ],W,τ)
Figure 5: A Fragment of PM !⊕
Example 4 We give in Figure 5 a fragment of M !⊕ illustrating our definitions on an example.
Let τ be an element of A . We consider terms of the form Mε =!(Ω! ⊕ε I), for ε ∈ D and
we look at some of the possible evolutions in M !⊕ from the associated state (M˙ε, ˙!(τ ( τ)) =
([] , [Mε]), ([] , [!(τ ( τ)]). In Figure 5, we denote by σ the type τ ( τ .
5.2 Distributions as States
Now that we have a LMC PM !⊕ modelling interaction between (tuple of) terms and their environ-
ment, we could define notions of metrics following one of the abstract definitions from the literature,
e.g. by defining the trace distance or the behavioural distance between terms. This is, by the way,
the approach followed in [7]. We prefer, however, to first turn PM !⊕ into a transition system L !⊕
whose states are distributions of tuples. This supports both a simple, coinductive presentation of
the trace distance, but also up-to techniques, as we will see in Section 5.6 below. Both will be very
convenient when evaluating the distance between concrete terms, e.g. our running example.
It turns out that the usual notion of an LTS is not sufficient for our purposes, since it lacks a
way to expose the observables of each state, i.e., its sum. We thus adopt the following definition:
Definition 2 A weighted labelled transition system (WLTS for short) is a quadruple in the form
L = (S,A, ·→, w) where:
• S is a set of states and A is a countable set of actions,
• ·→ is a transition function, such that, for every t ∈ S and a ∈ A, there exists at most one
s ∈ S, such that t a→s,
• w : S → [0, 1].
Please observe how WLTSs are deterministic transition systems. We define the WLTS L !⊕ by way
of the equations in Figure 6.
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SL !⊕ =
⋃
A∈T (Distr({K | ` K : A})× {A}) AL !⊕ = AM !⊕ ∪ {A | A ∈ T} w(D, A) =
∑
D
(D, A) A→(D, A) for A ∈ T (D, A) a→∑K∈U D(K) · PM !⊕((K,A))(a) for a ∈ AM !⊕ .
Figure 6: The WLTS L !⊕ = (SL !⊕ ,AL !⊕ ,
·→, w)
({M˙ε1}, ˙!σ) ({([Ω! ⊕
ε I] , [])1},
([σ] , []))
({([Ω! ⊕ε I] , [I])ε},
([σ] , [σ]))
({([Ω! ⊕ε I] , [I, I])ε
2},
([σ] , [σ, σ]))
({([Ω! ⊕ε I] , [V ])ε},
([σ] , [τ ]))
with ` V : τ
(?1) (!1)
(!1)
@1
(0¯,0¯,[σ],[σ],V,τ)
Figure 7: A Fragment of L !⊕
If t = (D, A) is in SL !⊕ , we say that t is a A-state. It is easy to check that L !⊕ is nothing more
than the natural way to turn PM !⊕ into a deterministic transition system. We illustrate this idea
in Figure 7, by giving a fragment of L !⊕ corresponding to (part of) the fragment of M
!
⊕ given in
Example 4.
5.3 A Coinductively Defined Metric
Following Desharnais et al. [13], we use a quantitative notion of bisimulation on L !⊕ to define
a distance between terms. The idea is to stipulate that, for any ε ∈ [0, 1], a relation R is an
ε-bisimulation if it is, somehow, ε-close to a bisimulation. The distance between two states t and
s is just the smallest ε such that t and s are ε-bisimilar. However, while in [13] the notion of
ε-bisimulation is local, we want it to be more restricted by the global deviation we may accept
considering arbitrary sequences of actions.
Definition 3 Let L = (S,A, ·→, w) be a WLTS. Let R be a symmetric and reflexive relation on
S, and ε ∈ [0, 1]. R is a ε-bisimulation whenever the following two conditions hold:
• if tR s, and t a→u, then there exists v such that s a→v, and it holds that uR v.
• if tR s, then |w(t)− w(s)| ≤ ε.
For every ε ∈ [0, 1], there exists a largest ε-bisimulation, that we indicate as Rε. Please observe
that it is not an equivalence relation (since it is not transitive). We can now define a metric on S :
δbL (t, s) = inf {ε | tRε s}.
The greatest lower bound is in fact reached as a δbL (t, s)-bisimulation: that’s the sens of the
following lemma.
Lemma 3 Let t, s ∈ SL !⊕ . Then δbL (t, s) ≤ ε if and only if tRε s.
Proof. The right-to-left implication is given by the definition of δbL . The other one comes from
the fact that the relation R given by tR s if δbL (t, s) ≤ ε is a ε-bisimulation. 
As a corollary, it is easy to see that the infinum in Definition 3 is in fact reached.
How can we turn δbL into a metric on terms? The idea is to consider the distributions on tuples
one naturally gets when evaluating the term. To every term M of type σ, we define sˆσ(M) ∈ SL !⊕
as ({V˙ JMK(V )}V ∈V , σ˙).
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Definition 4 For every terms M and N such that ` M : σ and ` N : σ, we set δbσ,!(M,N) =
δb
L !⊕
(sˆσ(M), sˆσ(N)).
Example 5 Consider again the terms Mε from Example 2. We fix a type τ , and define σ = τ ( τ .
As mentioned in Example 2, it holds that `Mε :!σ. Let now ε, µ, α be in [0, 1], and let R be any
α-bisimulation, such that sˆ!σ(Mε)R sˆ!σ(Mµ). Let {ti}i∈N, and {si}i∈N be families from SL !⊕ such
that sˆ!σ(Mε)
(?1)→ t0(!
1)→ . . .(!
1)→ ti . . . and sˆ!σ(Mµ)(?
1)→ s0(!
1)→ . . .(!
1)→si . . .. Since R is an α-bisimulation, for
every i, it holds that tiRsi. Looking at the definition of L !⊕, it is easy to realise that:
ti = {([Ω! ⊕ε I] , [I, . . . , I]), ([σ] , [σ, . . . , σ])ε
i}i∈N;
si = {([Ω! ⊕µ I] , [I, . . . , I]), ([σ] , [σ, . . . , σ])µ
i}i∈N.
By the definition of a α-bisimulation, we see that this implies that α ≥ |εi−µi|. Since this reasoning
can be done for every α such that Mε and Mµ are α-bisimilar, it means that: δ
b
!σ,!(Mε,Mµ) ≥
supi∈N|εi − µi|. Moreover, if we consider the special case where ε = 0, we can actually construct a
µ-bisimulation by taking
R= (sˆ!σ(M0), sˆ!σ(Mµ)) ∪ {(t0, s0)} ∪ {((0, A), (D, A) |
∑
D ≤ µ}.
We can easily check that R is indeed a µ-bisimulation, which tells us that δb!σ,!(M0,Mµ) = µ.
In Section 5.5 below, we will prove that δbσ,! coincides with δ
c
σ,!. While, as we will see soon, this
helps a lot when precisely evaluating the distance between terms, sometime a characterization of
δbσ,! by traces is very effective when deriving lower bounds on the distance between terms (see, e.g.,
Section 5.4).
5.4 A Trace Characterization
In this section, we will characterize the metric defined in the previous section in an inductive way,
by way of traces. This will be useful when proving full abstraction. A trace is a (possibly empty)
sequence of actions in AL !⊕ . Formally, the set of traces is generated by the following grammar:
T ∈ T ::= > | a · T where a ∈ AL !⊕ .
If T ∈ T , and t ∈ SL !⊕ , we write t
T→s if T = a1, . . . , an and there exists a sequence of states
t0, . . . , tn where t0 = t, tn = s, and moreover for every 1 ≤ i < n, it holds that ti−1 ai→ti. A trace T
is said to be admissible for t if there exists s such that t
T→s. The set of admissible traces for t is
indicated as A(t). The following is a well-posed definition, because the underlying WLTS L !⊕ is by
definition deterministic.
Definition 5 Let be t ∈ SL !⊕ , and T ∈ A(t). Then there is a unique u such that t
T→u, and we
define the success probability of T starting from t, that we note PRT(t), as w(u).
We can express the metric δb
L !⊕
as the maximum separation that a trace can induce:
Proposition 1 Let t, s ∈ SL !⊕ . Then:
δbL !⊕
(t, s) =
{
supT∈T |PRT(t)− PRT(s)| if A(t) = A(s);
1 otherwise.
Proof. We show separately the two inequalities:
• First, if two states t and s are related by an ε-bisimulation, we can see that |PRT(t)−PRT(s)| ≤ ε
(since the states obtained after having done every action in T are still ε-bisimilar).
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• To show the other implication, it is sufficient to define, for every ε, a relation imposing a bound
ε on the success probabilities of traces, and to show that it is a ε-bisimulation.

Please observe that Proposition 1 gives an inductive definition of δt! , while the notion of ε-
bisimulation is defined coinductively.
We conclude this section by stating a corollary of Proposition 1 which will be useful in the
following.
Corollary 1 Let be M and N of type σ, such that sˆσ(M) and sˆσ(N) are not ε-bisimilar. Then
there exists a trace T such that |PRT(sˆσ(M))− PRT(sˆσ(N))| ≥ ε.
5.5 Full Abstraction
In this section, we prove that δbσ,! coincides with δ
c
σ,!.
5.5.1 Soundness
We first of all show that the metric δbσ,! is sound with respect to δ
c
σ,!, i.e. that δ
b
σ,! discriminates at
least as much as δcσ,!:
Theorem 4 (Soundness) For any terms M and N of Λ!⊕, such that ` M : σ and ` N : σ, it
holds that δcσ,!(M,N) ≤ δbσ,!(M,N).
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 4. Please remember that our definition
of the tuple distance is based on the notion of ε-bisimulation. Proving the soundness theorem,
thus, requires us to show that for any terms M and N of type σ such that sˆσ(M) and sˆσ(N) are
ε-bisimilar, and for any τ ∈ A , C ∈ Cστ , it holds that |
∑JC[M ]K −∑JC[N ]K |≤ ε.
Our proof strategy is based on the fact that we can decompose every evaluation path of a term
in the form C[L] into external reduction steps (that is, steps that do not affect L), and internal
reduction steps (that is, reduction steps affecting L, but which can be shown to correspond only
to actions from L !⊕). Intuitively, if we reduce in parallel C[M ] and C[N ], we are going to have
steps where only the context is modified (and the modification does not depend on whether we
are considering the first program or the second), and steps where the internal part is modified,
but these steps cannot induce too much of a difference between the two programs, since the two
internal terms are ε-bisimilar.
We first of all need to generalize the notion of a context to one dealing with tuples rather than
terms. We in particular need contexts with multiple holes having types which match those of the
tuple (or, more precisely, the typtuplone-state) they are meant to be paired with. More formally:
Definition 6 (Tuple Contexts) Tuple contexts are triples of the form (C,A, γ), where C is an
open term, A = (σ, τ ) is a (n,m) tuple type, and γ is a type such that !x{1,...,n} :!σ,y{1,...,m} : τ `
C : γ. We note CT the set of tuple contexts. A tuple context (C,A, γ) is said to be an open value
if C is of one of the following four forms: λx.M , λ!x.M , !M , yi (where i ∈ N).
We now want to define when a tuple context and an A-state) can be paired together, and the
operational semantics of such an object, which will be derived from that of Λ!⊕ terms. This is the
purpose of the following definition:
Definition 7 (Tuple Context Pairs) We say that a pair u = (C, t) is a tuple context pair iff
t = (A,D) is an A-state, and ∃γ ∈ A , (C,A, γ) ∈ CT. We indicate as C×∆(U ) the set of tuple
context pairs. Moreover, given such a u = (C, (A,D)), we define F(u) as the (potentially infinite)
distribution over T given by:
F(u) = {C{x/M}{y/N}D(M ,N)}(M ,N)∈S(D).
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Giving a notion of context distance for A-states is now quite easy and natural, since we know how
contexts for such objects look like. For the sake of being as general as possible, this notion of a
distance is parametric on a set of tuple contexts C ⊆ CT.
Definition 8 Let be C ⊆ CT , A ∈ T, and t, s two A-states. We define:
δcC (t, s) = sup
(C,A,σ)∈C
∣∣∣∣∑JF(C,t)K −∑JF(C,s)K
∣∣∣∣
Unsurprisingly, the context distance between terms equals δcCT when applied to A-states obtained
through sˆσ(·):
Proposition 2 If `M,N : σ, then δcσ,!(M,N) = δcCT(sˆσ(M), sˆσ(N)).
But why did we introduce C×∆(U )? Actually, these pairs allow for a fine analysis of how
tuples behave when put in a context, which in turn is precisely what we need to prove Theorem 4.
This analysis, however, is not possible without endowing C×∆(U ) itself with an operational
semantics, which is precisely what we are going to do in the next paragraphs.
Semantics for C×∆(U ):
In this paragraph, we define, for every h ∈ C×∆(U ), its semantics JhKC×∆(U ), which is a
(potentially infinite) distribution over {k ∈ C×∆(U ) | F(k) ∈ Distr(V )}.
Two relations need to be defined. On on the one hand, we need a one-step labelled transition
relation →C×∆(U ) which turn an element of C×∆(U ) into a distribution over C×∆(U ) by
perfoming an action. Intuitively, one step of reduction in →C×∆(U ) corresponds to at most one
step of reduction in L !⊕. If that step exists, (i.e. if the term is reduced) then the label is the same,
and otherwise (i.e., if only the context is reduced), the label is just τ . We also need a multi-step
approximation semantics ⇒C×∆(U ) between elements of C×∆(U ) and subdistributions over the
same set. The latter is based on the former, and both are formally defined in Figure 8, where
• E is an evaluation context;
• t is an (n,m)-state from SL !⊕ ;
• h is a tuple-context pair from C×∆(U );
• For every context C, Cremove(E) stands for the context
C{y1/y1−#{j|j∈E∧j<1}} . . . {yn/yn−#{j|j∈E∧j<n}}
Definition 9 We define a one-step labelled transition relation for C×∆(U ), that we note
h
a→C×∆(U )D with h ∈ C×∆(U ), a ∈ AM !⊕ ∪ {τ}, and D a finite distribution over C×∆(U ),
as specified in Figure 8.
We call normal form those elements in C×∆(U ) that cannot be reduced by →C×∆(U ), and we
note NF (C×∆(U )) the set of normal forms.
Observe that we can actually give a characterization of normal forms:
NF (C×∆(U )) = {(C, t) ∈ C×∆(U ) | C is an open value }. (5)
If D ∈ Distr(C×∆(U )), we note V (D) = ∑h∈NF (C×∆(U ))D(h) · {h1}.
Definition 10 We define an approximation semantics relation for C×∆(U ), that we note
h⇒C×∆(U )D, where h is an element of C×∆(U ), and D is a finite distribution over NF (C×∆(U )),
as specified in Figure 8.
We define a semantics for C×∆(U ), that we denote JhKC×∆(U ) for h ∈ C×∆(U ), as:
JhKC×∆(U ) = sup{D | h⇒C×∆(U )D}.
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(E[(λz.N)M ], t)
τ→C×∆(U ){(E[N{z/M}], t)1} (E[(λ!z.N)!M ], t) τ→C×∆(U ){(E[N{z/M}], t)1}
(E[M ⊕N ], t) τ→C×∆(U ){(E[M ], t)1/2}+ {(E[N ], t)1/2}
t
(!j)→s
(E[xj ], t)
(!j)→C×∆(U ){(E[ym+1], s)1}
t
(?j)→ s C = E[(λ!z.N)!xn+1]remove({j})
(E[(λ!z.N)yj ], t)
(?j)→C×∆(U ){(C, s)1}
t
@jκ→s
t = (D, A) ∧A = σ, τ
τ j = η( ι
κ = ({1, . . . , n}, F,σ, τ , V, η) ∈J V
j 6∈ F
(E[yjV ], t)
@jκ→C×∆(U ){((E[ym+1])remove(F∪{j}), s)1}
h in normal form for
·→C×∆(U )
h⇒C×∆(U ){t1}
h⇒C×∆(U )0
h
a→C×∆(U )D k⇒C×∆(U )Ek
h⇒C×∆(U )
∑
k∈S(D)D(k) · Ek
Figure 8: Rules for ⇒C×∆(U )
Relating JKC×∆(U ) and JK:
We first show that this definition can indeed be related to the usual semantics for terms. This
takes the form of the following lemma:
Lemma 4 Let be u ∈ C×∆(U ). Then:
• {D | u⇒C×∆(U )D} is a directed set. We define JuKC×∆(U ) as its least upper bound;
• F(·) : Distr(C×∆(U ))→ Distr(T ) is continuous;
• JF(u)K = F(JuKC×∆(U )).
Proof. The proof of the first point is exactly the same as the one given in [10] for the operational
semantics of a probabilistic λ-calculus. The second and third ones are more involved.
Continuity of F(): We have to show that, for any countable directed subset I of Distr(C×∆(U )):
sup{F(D) | D ∈ I} = F(sup{D | D ∈ I}),
where we have extended in a natural way the definition of F(h) to F(D), withD ∈ Distr(C×∆(U )).
We can first observe that, since F() is monotonous, it holds that: F(sup{D | D ∈ I}) ≥
sup{F(D) | D ∈ I}. The other inequality is more involved. Let be E = sup{D | D ∈ I}.
Since I is a countable directed set, there exists an increasing sequence (Fn)n∈N in I such that
E = sup{Fn | n ∈ N}. For M ∈ T , we note αM,(C,t) =
∑
{K|C[K]=M} t(K). We use it to express
F(E):
F(E)(M) =
∑
(C,t)∈C×∆(U )
lim
n→∞Fn(C, t) · αM,(C,t).
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Moreover, please observe that we can restrict ourselves to consider distributions over a countable
subset of C×∆(U ) (which consists in the element of C×∆(U ) that can be generated by our
language). Since E is a distribution on a countable set, we know that for every ε there exists a
finite subset Jε of I, such that
∑
(C,t)6∈Jε E(C, t) ≤ ε. So for every ε, it holds that:
F(E)(M) =
∑
(C,t)∈Jε
lim
n→∞Fn(C, t) · αM,(C,t) + ε.
Since we now have to consider only a finite sum, we can exchange sum and limit:
F(E)(M) = lim
n→∞
∑
(C,t)∈Jε
Fn(C, t) · αM,(C,t) + ε.
And since that’s true for every ε, we have the result.
JF(·)K = F(J·KC×∆(U )): We show separately the two inequalities. First, we show that, for every
h ∈ C×∆(U ), F(JhKC×∆(U )) ≤ JF(h)K. The proof is based on the fact that Diagram (6)
commutes:
D
F(h) F(E)
h E
J·K J·K
F(·)
C×∆(U )
F(·)
(6)
The result stated by (6) is formally given by the following lemma.
Lemma 5 For every h ∈ C×∆(U ), it holds that if h→C×∆(U ) D, then JF(h)K = ∑k∈C×∆(U )D(k)·JF(k)K
Proof. The proof consists in considering every case in the definition of →C×∆(U ) , and use
continuity result for J·K. 
We are now able to show that F(J·KC×∆(U )) ≤ JF(·)K:
Proposition 3 For every h ∈ C×∆(U ), it holds that F(JhKC×∆(U )) ≤ JF(h)K.
Proof. Observe that it is sufficient to show that h⇒C×∆(U )D implies F(D) ≤ JF(h)K. We prove
it by induction on the derivation of h⇒C×∆(U )D.
• If this derivation is : h⇒C×∆(U )∅ , then D = ∅, and the result holds.
• If this derivation is h in normal form
h⇒C×∆(U ){h1} , then F(h) is a distribution over values (it can be
checked easily by considering the carcaterisation of normal forms given in Equation (5)), and
so JF(h)K = F(h), and the result holds.
• If this derivation is: h→C×∆(U ) F (k⇒C×∆(U )Ek)k∈S(F)
h⇒C×∆(U )
∑
k∈S(F) F(k) · Ek
, we apply Lemma 5 :
JF(h)K = ∑k∈S(F) F(s)·JF(k)K. Moreover, we can apply the induction hypothesis to s⇒C×∆(U )Es
for every k ∈ SF , which leads to: F(Ek) ≤ JF(k)K. Using it, we obtain:
F(D) =
∑
k
F(k) · F(Ek)
≤
∑
k
F(k) · JF(k)K
= JF(h)K
, which is the result.
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h→?C×∆(U ) {h1}
h→C×∆(U )
∑
i∈Iαi · {ki1} hi →?C×∆(U ) Ei
h→+C×∆(U )
∑
i∈I αi · Ei
h→+C×∆(U ) D
h→?C×∆(U ) D
Figure 9: Definition of h→+C×∆(U ) D

We are now going to show the other inequality, namely that, for any h ∈ C×∆(U ), JF(h)K ≤
F(JhKC×∆(U )). We first define a particular subset of C×∆(U ), namely those h, such that F(h)
can be seen as a term (remember that in the general case, it is a distribution over terms).
Definition 11 We define a subset UnaryC×∆(U ) of C×∆(U ), as: UnaryC×∆(U ) = {(C, (D, A)) ∈
C×∆(U ) | D is a Dirac distribution}. We define an operator (·)U:
(·)U : Distr(C×∆(U ))→ Distr(UnaryC×∆(U ))
D →
∑
h=(C,(E,A))∈C×∆(U )
D(h) ·
∑
K∈S(E)
E(K) · {(C, ({K1}, A))1}.
Observe that if h ∈ UnaryC×∆(U ), F(h) is a Dirac distribution on terms. By abuse of notation,
we’ll use F(h) to denote the term M such that F(h) = {M1}. The operator (·)U preservesJKC×∆(U ), as formally stated in Lemma 6 below:
Lemma 6 For every D ∈ Distr(C×∆(U )), it holds that: F(JDKC×∆(U )) = F(JDUKC×∆(U )).
Proof. It is a consequence of the fact thatL !⊕ has the corresponding property: if t = (D, A) ∈ SL !⊕ ,
t
a→(E , B), then for every K ∈ S(D) there exists FK such that ({K1}, A) a→(FK , B), and moreover
E = ∑K∈S(D)D(K) · FK . 
We introduce some notations on ⇒: we write M n⇒ D with n ∈ N, if there exists a derivation
∆ : M ⇒ D of size at most n. Moreover, we write D n⇒ E if there exists a finite set I such that
D = ∑i∈I αi · {Mi1}, and such that moreover Mi n⇒ Ei, and E = ∑i∈I αi · Ei. Please observe that
this definition imply that D is always a finite distribution over terms. We also introduce auxiliary
notations for →C×∆(U ), as given in Figure 9.
Moreover, if D, E are distributions over a set, we say that D is a finite approximation of E if D
is finite, and moreover D ≤ E . We denote it by D
f
≤ E .
We first consider the case where h ∈ UnaryC×∆(U ) is such that F(h) is a value. We can see
that the following diagram commutes
{V 1}
F(h) F(k)
h {k1}
1
F(·)
?
C×∆(U )
F(·)
(7)
, as formally stated in Lemma 7 below.
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Lemma 7 Let be h ∈ UnaryC×∆(U ), such that F(h) is a value. There exists k ∈ UnaryC×∆(U )
such that h→?C×∆(U ) {k1} and k ∈ NF (C×∆(U )) verifies F(k) = F(h).
Proof. The proof consists in showing that, if F(h) is a value, then there is a finite sequence
h = k0 . . . , kn with ki →C×∆(U ) {ki+11}, every ki ∈ UnaryC×∆(U ), kn ∈ NF (C×∆(U )), and
moreover F(ki) = F(h). 
We now consider the case where F(h) is not a value: it means that we have to consider
D ∈ Distr(T ), such that F(h) n⇒ D, with n > 1. Our aim is to show that D ≤ JhKC×∆(U ). In
that aim, we show first that Diagram 8 below commutes,
D
F(h) F(F)
h E
n>1
<n
F(·)
+
C×∆(U )
F(·)◦
f
≤◦ ·U
(8)
as formally stated by the following Lemma:
Lemma 8 For any h ∈ UnaryC×∆(U ), such that F(h) is not a value, there exists E ∈ Distr(C×∆(U ))
such that h →+C×∆(U ) E, and for every D ∈ Distr(T ), and n ≥ 1 such that F(h)
n⇒ D , there
exists F such that F
f
≤ EU, and moreover F(F) m⇒ D with m < n.
Before doing the proof, we give some intuitions about this diagram: we first consider these steps
of →C×∆(U ) that reduce more that one redex. It forces us to use not the one step transition →
to talk about the semantics for terms, but directly the approximation semantics⇒. Let us consider
now the steps of →C×∆(U ) where no redex is reduced: more precisely, we can characterize them
as the ones corresponding to actions passing a term that is already a value from the exponential
part to the linear part of the inside tuple. The proof is made possible by the fact that we can
show that there can only be a finite number of reduction step →C×∆(U ) that don’t reduce the
underlying term, before there is a step reducing at least a redex in it.
Proof. We are first going to state a lemma about the approximation semantics⇒, which we’ll need
later in the proof of Lemma 8. Indeed, in order to manage the problem of a step of →C×∆(U )
corresponding to strictly more than one step of →, we need to transform a derivation ∆ : M ⇒ D
in derivations corresponding to reduction processes done after having completely reduced part
of M . More precisely, the Lemma 9 below gives us a way to extract of a derivation tree the
subtrees corresponding to the evaluation after having reduced all the redex in a subterm in
evaluation position. Please observe that it talks only about semantics of term, and express a form
of compositionnality in the derivation. It will be used to treat the case of applicative actions, where
we reduce many redex in one step of reduction for →C×∆(U ) .
Lemma 9 Let be M a closed term which isn’t a value, with E[M ]
n⇒ D a valid derivation of the
approximation semantics. Then there exists a finite set I ⊆ N, and for every i ∈ I a value Vi,
a coefficient αi, and a valid derivation Ξi : E[Vi]
m⇒ Ei such that n < m, D =
∑
i∈I αi · Ei, and
moreover for every V ,
∑
i|Vi=V αi ≤ JMK(V )
Proof. The proof is by induction on ∆. 
Let us now show the first part of Lemma 8. Let h ∈ UnaryC×∆(U ) such that F(h) is not a value.
By definition of UnaryC×∆(U ), h is of the form: h = (C, ({K1}, A)). We are going to construct
the distribution E by case analysis on C . Please observe that there is at most one possible action
a such that (C, ({K1}, A)) a→C×∆(U ), and moreover it depends only on in C and A. Consequently,
we do a case analysis on the action a.
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• If a = τ : it means that the reduced redex doesn’t affect the inside tuple. We take E such that
h
τ→C×∆(U )E =
∑
1≤i≤n
1
n{(Ci, (K,A))1}. Observe that E is actually a finite distribution. Let
be D ∈ Distr(V ), and n ≥ 1, such that F(h) n⇒ D. Since F(h) 6∈ V , and n ≥ 1, F(h) n⇒ D is of
the form:
F(h)→ N1, . . . , Np (Ni mi⇒ Di)1≤i≤p
F(h)⇒ D = ∑ 1n · Di
, where for every i, mi < n. We take F = E , m = max{ni | 1 ≤ i ≤ p} < n and the result is
obtained by seeing that F(F) = ∑1≤i≤p 1n · {Ni1} m⇒ D.
• If a = (?j): then C = E[(λ!z.M)yj ].
It means that the only rule than can be used to show h→C×∆(U ) · is:
t
(?j)→ s
h = (E[(λ!z.M)yj ], t)
(?j)→ C×∆(U ){k1}
where k = (E[(λ!z.M)!xn+1]remove({j}), s).
Observe that k ∈ {l ∈ UnaryC×∆(U ) | l a→C×∆(U )· implies a = τ}.
Using the previous case, we know that there exist Ek verifying the condition of Lemma 8 with
respect to k. Now, we are going to show that we can reuse it with respect to h. First, notice
that h→+C×∆(U ) E (since →+C×∆(U ) is transitive). So we can take E = Ek. Let be n ≥ 1, and
D such that F(h) n⇒ D. Since F(h) = F(k), it holds that F(k) n⇒ D. We can conclude by using
the properties of Ek with respect to k.
• If a = @jκ: it means that C = E[yjV ], and the rule used to reduce h by →C×∆(U ) is the
applicative one. So we can take E defined as:
t
@
j
κ→s t = (D, A) ∧ A = σ, τ
τ j = η( ι
κ = ({1, . . . , n}, F,σ, τ , V, η) ∈JV
j 6∈ F
(E[yjV ], t)
@
j
κ→C×∆(U )E = {((E[ym+1])remove(F∪{j}), s)1}
We see that h→+C×∆(U ) E . Let be D, and n ≥ 1, such that F(h)
n⇒ D. We need to define F as
specified in Lemma 8. Notice that E 6∈ Distr(UnaryC×∆(U )), but we are able to express EU as:
EU =
∑
W∈V
JF(yjV, t)K(W ) · {kW 1},
where F(kW ) = (F(E, t))[W ], and moreover kW ∈ UnaryC×∆(U ). We are going to apply
Lemma 9 to (F(E, t))[F(yjV, t)] : there exist a finite set I, and a family (Wi)i∈I of V , such
that
∑
i∈I αi · {(F(E, t))[Wi]1} m⇒ D, with m < n, and for every W ∈ V , it holds that∑
i|Wi=W αi ≤ JF(yjV, t)K(W ). Now we define F = ∑αi · {kWi1}, and we can see that F f≤ EU
and F(F) m⇒ D, and so we have the result.
• If a = (!j): it means that C = E[xj ], and that the rule used is:
t
(!j)→ s
(E[xj ], t)
(!j)→C×∆(U ){(E[ym+1], s)1}
We define M and N such that K = (M ,N). We can distinguish two cases, depending on
M j :
• If M j is not a value. Then we are going to apply Lemma 9. Indeed, F(C, t) = F(E, t)[M j ].
The proof is essentially the same that for the applicative case.
• If M j is a value. Then we can define k ∈ UnaryC×∆(U ) by k = (E[ym+1], s). It is possible
that the only action able to reduce k is of the form (!k), However, we can iterate the previous
reasonning (which intuitively corresponds to do reduction on C×∆(U ), but not in the
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actual term) only a finite number of times (because we can have only a finite number of
occurrences of values that are in an evaluation position in M = F(C, t)). So after a finite
number of steps like that, we arrive to reduce this case to one we have already considered.

Lemma 10 For every h ∈ UnaryC×∆(U ), if F(h)⇒ D, then D ≤ F(JhKC×∆(U )).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the size n of the derivation F(h)⇒ D:
• If n = 0, then D = ∅, and the result is true.
• If n = 1, or D = ∅, or D = {F(h)1}, and then F(h) is a value, and we can apply the second
point of Lemma 8.
• If n > 1, then it implies that F(h) is not a value, and so we can apply the second point of
Lemma 8, and apply the induction hypothesis on the strictly smaller derivations it gives us.

As a corollary, we can see that that JF(h)K ≤ F(JhKC×∆(U )) holds in fact for every h ∈
C×∆(U ), and not only for those in UnaryC×∆(U ):
Proposition 4 For any h ∈ C×∆(U ), it holds that JF(h)K ≤ F(JhKC×∆(U ))
Proof. First, we can see that Lemma 10 imply that JF(h)K ≤ F(JhKC×∆(U )) for every h ∈
UnaryC×∆(U ). Lemma 6 allows to generalize it to the whole if C×∆(U ). 
We have now only to sum up Proposition 3 and 4 to obtain the correspondence betweenJ·KC×∆(U ) and J·K. 
Equivalence relations on C×∆(U ): Before proceeding, we need to understand how any
reflexive and symmetric relation on C×∆(U ) can be turned into a relation on distributions on
C×∆(U ). If R is a reflexive and symmetric relation on C×∆(U ), we lift it to distributions
over C×∆(U ) by stipulating that D R E whenever there exists a countable set I, a family
(pi)i∈I of positive reals of sum smaller than 1, and families (hi)i∈I , (ki)i∈I in C×∆(U ), such that
D = {hipi}i∈I , E = {kipi}i∈I , and moreover hi R ki for every i ∈ I.
We now want to precisely capture when a relation on C×∆(U ) can used to evaluate the
distance between tuple-context pairs.
Definition 12 Let R be a reflexive and symmetric relation on C×∆(U ).
• We say that R is preserved by →C×∆(U ) if, for any h, k ∈ C×∆(U ) such that h R k, if
h
a→C×∆(U )D, then there exists E such that k a→C×∆(U )E, and D R E.
• We say that R is ε-bounding if h R k, implies |∑F(h) −∑F(k)| ≤ ε.
• Let C be a set of tuple contexts, and t, s ∈ SL !⊕ be two A-states. We say that R is C -closed with
respect to t and s, if for every C and γ such that (C,A, γ) ∈ C , it holds that (C, t) R (C, s).
Please observe how any relation preserving →C×∆(U ) and being ε-bounding can be seen somehow
as an ε-bisimulation, but on tuple-context pairs. The way we defined the lifting, however, makes it
even a stronger notion, i.e., the ideal candidate for an intermediate step towards Soundness.
Preservation by →C×∆(U ) leads us to preservation (in a weaker sense) by ⇒C×∆(U ). That’s
the sense of the following lemma.
Lemma 11 Let R be a reflexive and symmetric relation on C×∆(U ) preserved by →C×∆(U ).
Let h, k ∈ C×∆(U ) be such that hRk. Let D be such that h⇒C×∆(U )D. Then there exists E
such that k⇒C×∆(U )E, and DRE.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the derivation of h⇒C×∆(U )D.
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• if the derivation is h⇒C×∆(U )∅ , the result holds.

Lemma 12 If h, k ∈ SL !⊕ are such that there exists a reflexive and symmetric relation R preserved
by→C×∆(U ), ε-bounding, and containing (h, k), then it holds that |
∑
F(JhKC×∆(U )) −∑F(JkKC×∆(U ))| ≤ ε.
We use Lemma 12 to show the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Let C be a set of tuple contexts, t, s two A-states and R a reflexive and transitive
relation preserved by →C×∆(U ), ε-bounding, and C -closed with respect to t and s. Then it holds
that δcC ,!(t, s) ≤ ε.
Proof. It’s a direct consequence of Lemma 12. 
Moreover, we see that the conditions from Definition 12 are enough to guarantee that two terms
are at context distance at most ε.
Proposition 6 Let M,N be two terms of type σ. Suppose there exists a reflexive and symmetric
relation R on C×∆(U ), which is preserved by →C×∆(U ), ε-bounding, and CT-closed with respect
to sˆσ(M) and sˆσ(N). Then δ
c
σ,!(M,N) ≤ ε.
ε-bisimulation and ⇒C×∆(U ) : What remains to be done, then, is to show that if two terms
are related by Rε, then they themselves satisfy Definition 12. Compulsory to that is showing that
any ε-bisimulation can at least be turned into a relation on C×∆(U ).
We need to do that, in particular, in a way guaranteeing the C -closure of the resulting relation,
and thus considering all possible tuple contexts from C :
Definition 13 Let R be a reflexive and symmetric relation on SL !⊕ . Let be C a set of tuple
contexts. We define its contextual lifting to C×∆(U ) with respect to C as the following binary
relation on C×∆(U ):
R̂
C
A =
⋃
(C,A,σ)∈C
{((C, t), (C, s)) | t, sA-states, t R s}; R̂C =
⋃
A∈T
R̂
C
A .
The following result tells us that, indeed, any ε-bisimulation can be turned into a relation satisfying
Definition 12:
Proposition 7 Let R be a ε-bisimulation. Then R̂
CT
is preserved by →C×∆(U ) and ε-bounding,
and CT-closed with respect to every t, s such that t R s.
Proof. Let R be an ε-bisimulation. We obtain that R̂
CT
is CT-closed as a direct consequence
of the lifting definition. Similarly, we see that R̂
CT
is ε-bounding as a direct consequence of the
definition of a ε-bisimulation. Now, let us show that R̂
CT
is preserved by→C×∆(U ). Let be A such
that (h, k) ∈ R̂C
T
A . The proof is by induction on the derivation of h⇒C×∆(U )D. It is based on the
following idea: for every C such that there exist σ for which (C,A, σ) is a tuple context:
• or for every A-state t, (C, t) is in normal form.
• or there exists a family (Ci)1≤i≤n such that (Ci, A, σ) ∈ CT, and moreover for every A-state t,
(C, t)
τ→C×∆(U )
∑
1≤i≤n {(Ci, t)1}
• or there exists an action a of L !⊕, and D,B such that (D,B, σ), such that for every A-state t,
(C, t)
a→C×∆(U ){(D, s)1}, and t a→s.

We are finally ready to give a proof of soundness:
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Proof. [of Theorem 4] Consider two terms M and N of type σ. Let ε be δbσ,!(M,N). We take R
ε
(defined in Definition 3 as the largest ε-bisimulation), and we see that sˆσ(M)R
ε sˆσ(N). Proposition
7 tells us that we can apply Proposition 6 to M , N , and (̂Rε)
CT
. Doing so we obtain that
δcσ,!(M,N) ≤ ε, which is the thesis. 
5.5.2 Completeness
We can actually show that δbσ,! is also complete with respect to the contextual distance: that is the
aim of this section.
Theorem 5 (Full Abstraction) For every σ, δcσ,! = δ
b
σ,!.
Proof. One inequality is given by Theorem 4.
Please observe that Theorem 4 gives us already half of Theorem 5: indeed, it says that for
every M and N of type σ, it holds that: δcσ,!(M,N) ≤ δbσ,!(M,N). Our goal is now to show the
other inequality, that is δcσ,!(M,N) ≥ δbσ,!(M,N) . The proof of the other one is based on the trace
characterization δb
L !⊕
given in Section 5.4. More precisely, we use the fact that every trace can
be simulated by a context: for every A ∈ T, we construct a tuple context (C,A, τ), such that for
every A-state t, it holds that PRT(t) = Obs(F(C, t)).
Lemma 13 For every T ∈ T , for every A ∈ T such that T is an admissible trace for A, there
exists a term C, and a type γ such that:
• (C,A, γ) is a tuple context.
• for every t ∈ SL !⊕ of the form t = (D, A), it holds that
∑JF(C,t)K = PRT(t).
Proof. Let be A = (σ, τ ) a type for tuple. Let be (n,m) the arity of A. We define a context C,
and a type γ, by induction on the length of the admissible trace :
• if T = >: We want a context that terminates with probability 1, whatever term we fill it with.
We take:
C = λz.zy1 . . . ym
γ = (τ 1 ( . . .( τm( α)( α
• if T = (?i) · S. Let be B such that, whenever we do the action (?i) from a A-state, we obtain a
B-state. Let D and η the open term and type obtained by induction hypothesis applied to S
and B. We take γ = η, and:
C = (λ!z.D{xn+1/z}add({i}))yi
• if T = (!i) · S. Let be B such that, whenever we do the action (!i) from a A-state, we obtain a
B-state. Let D and η be the open term and type obtained by induction hypothesis applied to
S and B. We take γ = η, and C = D{xi/ym+1}.
• if T = @iκ · S. Since T is an admissible trace for A = (σ, τ ), κ should be of the form:
κ = (E,F,σ, τ ,M, ι). Let B be the corresponding tuple type obtained after the action (!i),
and let be D and η the term and the type given by the induction hypothesis and B. Then we
take γ = η:
C = (Dadd(F∪{i})){yi/yn+1M}

When we combine Proposition 13 and Proposition 1, we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 2 Let be t and s two A-states.
δbL !⊕
(t, s) ≤ sup{|Obs(F(C, t))−Obs(F(C, s))| s.t. ∃σ, (C,A, σ) ∈ CT}
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Proof. Let be t and s two A-states that are not ε-bisimilar. Then there exists a trace T that shows
it, that is verifying |PRt(T)− PRs(T)| > ε. Now, we just have to take the open term C such that
(C,A, ·) ∈ CT , corresponding to this trace T. And we have |Obs(F(C, t))−Obs(F(C, s))| > ε,
and the result folds. 
We can now transform Corollary 2 in a result on terms, which is exactly what we need to end
the proof of theorem 5.
Lemma 14 Let be M , N of type σ. Then:
δbσ,!(M,N) ≤ sup{|Obs(C[M ])−Obs(C[N ])| | ∃τ s.t. hole : σ ` C : τ}
Proof. Let us unfold the definition of δbσ,!(M,N): please recall that we defined it as δ
b
L !⊕
(sˆσ(M), sˆσ(N)).
Let be A such that sˆσ(·) is an A-term. Please recall that A = ([], [σ]). We can see that for every
C, τ such that (C,A, τ) ∈ CT, it holds that C can in fact be see as a context for terms: more
precisely, it holds that y1 : σ ` C : τ and moreover, it holds that
Obs(((λy1.C)hole)[M ]) = Obs(F(C, sˆσ(M))) Obs(((λy1.C)hole)[N ]) = Obs(F(C, sˆσ(N))).
Since we can transform every tuple of context for A into a context on terms in that way, we obtain
the result. 
Theorem 5 is a direct consequence of Lemma 14: indeed, please recall that we had to show that
δcσ,!(M,N) ≥ δbσ,!(M,N). Since that’s exactly what Lemma 14 says, it ends the proof.

5.6 On an Up-to-Context Technique
5.6.1 Up-to ε-bisimulation
As we have just shown, context distance can be characterized as a coinductively defined metric,
which turns out to be useful when evaluating the distance between terms. In this section, we will
go even further, and show how an up-to-context [32] notion of ε-bisimulation is precisely what we
need to handle our running example.
We first of all need to generalize our definition of a tuple: an open tuple is a pair (M ,N),
where M and N are sequences of (not necessarily closed) typable terms.
Definition 14 If K = (M ,N) is an open tuple, and A = (γ,η) is a tuple type, we say that
(σ, τ ,K,A) is a substitution judgment iff:
• !x :!σ `M i : γi;
• if n and m are such that τ is a n-sequence, and N a m-sequence, then there exists a partition
{E1, . . . Em} of {1, . . . , n} such that yEj : τEj ` Nj : ηj for every j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
J subst is the set of all substitution judgments.
If κ = (σ, τ ,K,A) ∈J subst, and H ∈ U is of type (σ, τ ), then there is a natural way to form a
tuple κ[H], namely by substituting the free variables of K by the components of H. In the following,
we restrict J subst to those judgments κ such that for every H, terms in the linear part of κ[H]
are values. Observe that we always have ` κ[H] : A. We extend the notation κ[H] to distributions
over U : if D is a distribution over tuples of type (σ, τ ), we note κ[D] = {κ[H]D(H)}H∈U , which
is a distribution over tuples of type A. Moreover, we want to be able to apply our substitution
judgments to the states of L !⊕. If t = (D, (σ, τ )) ∈ SL !⊕ , and κ = (σ, τ ,K,A), the state of L !⊕
defined by (κ[D], A) will be often indicated as κ[t].
Example 6 We illustrate on a simple example the use of substitution judgments. Let be τ any
type. Consider σ = [τ ( τ ], and τ = []. Moreover, let K = ([x1] , [I]) and A = ([τ ( τ ] , [τ ( τ ]).
Then κ = (σ, τ ,K,A) is a substitution judgment. We consider now a tuple of type (σ, τ ). In fact,
we take here a tuple that will be useful in order to analyze our running example: H = ([Ω! ⊕ε I] , []).
By substituting H in κ, we obtain κ[H] = ([Ω! ⊕ε I] , [I]), and we can see easily that we obtain
indeed a tuple of type A.
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The main idea behind up-to context bisimulation is to allow for the freedom of discarding any
context when proving a relation to be a bisimulation. This is captured by the following definition:
Definition 15 Let R be a relation on SL !⊕ . R is an ε-bisimulation up to context if for every t
and s such that t R s, the following holds:
• there exists C ∈ T such that t = (D, C), s = (E , C), and |∑D −∑E | ≤ ε.
• for any a ∈ AM !⊕ , if t
a→u = (D, A) and s a→v = (E , A), then there exists a finite set I ⊆ N such
that:
• there is a family of rationals (pi)i∈I such that
∑
i∈I pi ≤ 1;
• there are families σi, τ i, and Ki, such that κi = (σi, τ i,Ki, A) is a substitution judgment
for every i ∈ I;
• there are distributions over tuples Di, Ei such that (Di, Bi) R (Ei, Bi);
and moreover D = ∑i∈I pi · κi[Di], and E = ∑i∈I pi · κi[Ei].
The just introduced proof method is indeed quite useful when handling our running example.
Example 7 We show that up-to bisimulations can handle our running example. Please recall
the definition of Mε given in Example 2. First, we can see that, for every a, for every type
τ , sˆ!(τ(τ)(Ma) = ({([] , [!Ω! ⊕a I])1}, ([] , [!τ ( τ ])). We define a relation R on SL !⊕ containing
(sˆ!(τ(τ)(Mε), sˆ!(τ(τ)(Mµ)), and we show that it is an γ-bisimulation up-to context for an ap-
propriate γ. In order to simplify the notations, we define B = ([τ ( τ ], []), and tn, sn ∈ SL !⊕
as:
tn = ({([(Ω! ⊕ε I)], [])(ε
n)}, B), sn = ({([(Ω! ⊕µ I)], [])(µ
n)}, B).
Then, we define the relation R as R= {(sˆσ(M), sˆσ(N))} ∪ {(tn, sn) | n ∈ N} . One can check that
R is indeed a γ-bisimulation up-to-context (where γ = supn∈N|εn − µn|) by carefully analysing
every possible action. The proof is based on the following observations:
• The only action starting from sˆσ(M) or sˆσ(N) is a = (?1), passing a term to the exponential
part of the tuple, then we end up in t0 and s0 respectively.
• If we start from tn or sn, the only relevant action is Milner’s action a = (!1), consisting
in taking a copy of the term in the exponential part, evaluating it, and putting the result in
the linear part. We can see (using the substitution judgment κ defined in Example 6), that
tn
a→κ[tn+1], and similarly sn a→κ[sn+1], and the result follows.
Example 8 We give now an example illustrating a not-so-obvious constraint in the definition of a
substitution judgment. Suppose we take K = ([x1] , [x1]), and A = ([σ] , [σ]). Then κ = ([σ] , [] ,K,A)
is a not a substitution judgment, since x1 appear in the linear part of K, and we need non-linear
variables to type it. The constraint is there to avoid the situation in which, ({([V ] , [])1}, ([σ] , []))
and ({([W ] , [])1}, ([σ] , [])) would be up-to bisimilar for every V and W of type σ.
5.6.2 Soundness of up-to technique
Bisimulations up-to contexts would be useless without a correctness result like the following one:
Theorem 6 If R is an ε-bisimulation up-to context, then R⊆Rε.
The remaining of this section consists in the proof of Theorem 6. The proof is an extension of that
of Theorem 4 (although technically more involved).
We first define a relation D . E between distribution over C×∆(U ), which expresses the fact
that E is obtained from D by changing the way we split our term into external environment and
inside tuple:
Definition 16 Let be D and E two distributions over C×∆(U ). We write D . E if:
• D = ∑i∈I αi{(Ci, ti)1}, I countable set.
• ti is a Ai-state.
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• For every i, there exist an open tuple Ki, a tuple type Bi = (σi, τ i), and si a Bi-state, such
that:
• (σi, τ i,Ki, Ai) is a substitution judgment,
• ti = κi[si]
• E = ∑i∈I αi · {F(Ci, (Ki, Ai)), si1}
Please observe that there are many possible distributions E that verify D . E . We can express
the fact that . is a congruence relation that doesn’t modify the underlying program, and that
moreover, the relation . is designed to preserve normal forms with respect to →C×∆(U ) , by the
following lemma:
Lemma 15 Let be D, E such that D . E. Then:
• F(D) = F(E).
• If S(D) ⊆ NF (C×∆(U )), it holds that S(E) ⊆ NF (C×∆(U )).
Proof. It is a direct consequence of the unfolding of the definition of .. 
Now, we are ready to define a relation h→.C×∆(U ) D, that intuitively corresponds to do a step
→C×∆(U ) , and then potentially change the way we split programs between internal part and
external part.
Definition 17 We define a relation h →.C×∆(U ) D, where h ∈ C×∆(U ), and D a finite
distribution over C×∆(U ), by the following rule:
h→C×∆(U ) E E .D
h→.C×∆(U ) D
We define below the lifting of →.C×∆(U ) to distribution over C×∆(U ):
Definition 18 We define a one-step relation reduction D →.C×∆(U ) E on (finite) distributions
over C×∆(U ) as follows:
D = V (D) +∑i∈I αi · {hi1} hi →.C×∆(U ) Ei
D →.C×∆(U ) V (D) +
∑
i∈I αi · Ei
Since →.C×∆(U ) is non-confluent, we cannot use it to define a semantics for C×∆(U ) as we
did for →C×∆(U ) . We are going to define a notion of semantics for C×∆(U ) depending
on what infinite sequance of reduction we are considering: for h ∈ C×∆(U ), we call infinite
reduction sequence starting from h a sequence s = (Dn)n∈N of distributions over C×∆(U ), where
D0 = {h1}, and Dn →.C×∆(U ) Dn+1 for every n ∈ N. The idea is that every reduction sequence
gave a different semantics for h, but that we obtain the same distribution over terms for all of
them if we use F(·) on them. Let us formalize this idea.
Definition 19 If h ∈ C×∆(U ), and s = (Dn)n∈N a reduction sequence starting from h. We
call semantics of h with respect to s, and we note JhKC×∆(U )s the distribution over C×∆(U )
given by JhKC×∆(U )s = sup{V (Dn) | n ∈ N}.
Please observe that Definition 19 is well-posed since the V (Dn) are an increasing sequence of
distributions over normal forms.
We state below the analogue of the third point of Lemma 4 for up-to bisimulation:
Proposition 8 Let be h ∈ C×∆(U ), and an infinite reduction sequence s = D0 = {h1} →.C×∆(U )
D1 . . .→.C×∆(U ) Dn . . . . Then F(JhKC×∆(U )s ) = JF(h)K.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of Lemma 4, and is based on the following two lemmas, that
are a variant of Lemma 5 and 8: the following first lemma is used to show that F(JhKC×∆(U )s ) ≤JF(h)K.
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Lemma 16 Let be D, E such that D →.C×∆(U ) E. Then JF(D)K = JF(E)K.
D
F(F) F(E)
F E
J·K J·K
F(·)
.
C×∆(U )
F(·)
(9)
That other lemma is used to show the other direction, namely that F(JhKC×∆(U )s ) ≥ JF(h)K.
Lemma 17 Let be h ∈ C×∆(U ) such that F(h) 6∈ V , and an infinite reduction sequence
D0 = {h1} →.C×∆(U ) D1 . . .→.C×∆(U ) Dm . . . . Then there exists i ∈ N, such that for every E and
n ∈ N with F(h) n⇒ E, there exists a finite F ∈ Distr(UnaryC×∆(U )), and an infinite reduction
sequence Fi = F →.C×∆(U ) Fi+1 . . . →.C×∆(U ) Fm . . ., verifying ∀i, Fi
U ≤ DiU, and such that
moreover F(F) m⇒ E, with m < n.
It can be expressed by the following diagram:
E
F(h) F(F)
h Di
n>1
<n
F(·)
+
C×∆(U )
F(·)◦
f
≤◦ ·U
(10)

Observe that, even if R is an up-to bisimulation, it does not necessarily means that R̂
CT
preserves
→C×∆(U ). We want to express the fact that it preserves →.C×∆(U ), but we have to be more
careful, since this reduction relation is non-deterministic. To deal with it, we introduce a more
general preservation notion:
Definition 20 We say that a relation R over C×∆(U ) is weakly preserved by →.C×∆(U ) if,
for any h, k ∈ C×∆(U ) such that h R k, and h 6∈ NF (C×∆(U )), then there exists D and E
such that h→.C×∆(U ) D, k →.C×∆(U ) E, and D R E.
Our notion of weak preservation is enough to state the following variant of Proposition 5.
Proposition 9 Let C be a set of tuple contexts, t, s two A-states and R a reflexive and symmetric
relation weakly preserved by →.C×∆(U ) , ε-bounding, and C -closed with respect to t and s. Then it
holds that δcC ,!(t, s) ≤ ε.
An ε up-to bisimulation verifies the condistions of Proposition9, as stated by the analogue of
Proposition 7 below.
Proposition 10 Let be R an up-to bisimulation. Then R̂
CT
is weakly preserved by →.C×∆(U )
and ε-bounding, and CT-closed with respect to every t, s such that t R s.
We are now ready to do the proof of Theorem 6. Let be R an ε up-to bisimulation, ans
t, s ∈ SL !⊕ such that tR s. Using our completness result stated in Theorem 5, we see that it is
enough to show that δcCT,!(t, s) ≤ ε. Propositions 9 and 10 give us immediately the result.
Example 9 We can exploit the soundness of up-to bisimulation to obtain the contextual distance
for our running example, and conclude that δc!(τ(τ),!(Mε,Mµ) = supn∈N|εn − µn|. The context
distance between Mε and Mµ is thus strictly between 0 and 1 whenever |ε− µ|
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6 Probabilistic λ-Calculi, in Perspective
The calculus Λ
!,‖
⊕ we analyzed in this paper is, at least apparently, nonstandard, given the presence
of parallel disjunction, but also because of the linear refinement it is based on. In this section,
we will reconcile what we have done so far with calculi in the literature, and in particular with
untyped probabilistic λ-calculi akin to those studied, e.g., in [9, 5].
We consider a language Λ⊕ defined by the following grammar:
M ∈ Λ⊕ ::= x | MM | λx.M | M ⊕ M.
6.1 On Stable Fragments of M !⊕.
Our objective in this section is to characterize various notions of context distance for Λ⊕ by way
of appropriate embeddings into Λ!⊕, and thus by the LMC M
!
⊕. It is quite convenient, then, to
understand when any fragment of M !⊕ is sufficiently robust so as to be somehow self-contained:
Definition 21 We say that the pair (Sˆ, Aˆ), where Sˆ ⊆ SM !⊕ , and Aˆ ⊆ T × AM !⊕ is a stable
fragment of M !⊕ iff for every pair (A, a) ∈ Aˆ, for every A-state t, and for every s ∈ S such that
PM !⊕(t, a, s) > 0, it holds that s ∈ Sˆ.
Using a stable fragment of M !⊕, we can restrict the WLTS L
!
⊕ in a meaningful way. The idea is
that we only consider some of the states of L !⊕, and we are able to choose the possible actions
depending on the type of the state of L !⊕ we consider.
Definition 22 If F = (Sˆ, Aˆ) is a stable fragment of M !⊕, we define a WLTS by LF =
(SLF ,ALF , ·→F , wF ), as
SLF =
⋃
A∈T Distr({K | (K,A) ∈ Sˆ})× {A}; ALF =
⋃
(A,a)∈Aˆ{a} ∪T;
·→F = ·→∩ {((D, A), a, s) | S(D) ⊆ Sˆ, (A, a) ∈ Aˆ};
and wF is defined as expected.
We want to be able to define a notion of distance on a fragment of the original language Λ!⊕, so
that it verifies the soundness property for a restricted set of contexts. To do that, we need the
restricted set of contexts C to be preserved by the stable fragment:
Definition 23 Let F = (Sˆ, Aˆ) be a stable fragment of M !⊕. Let C be a set of tuple contexts. We
say that C is preserved by F , if the following holds: for any (C,A, γ) ∈ C that is not an open
value and any A-state t in SLF , there exists a such that (A, a) ∈ Aˆ
⋃
(T×{τ}), (C, t) a→C×∆(U )E,
and moreover:
S(E) ⊆
⋃
B∈T{(D, s) | s a B-state ∧ ∃η s.t. (D,B, η) ∈ C }
We are now able to provide guarantees that the contextual distance δcC with respect to our restricted
set of contexts C is smaller that the distance defined on the LTSLF induced by our stable fragment
F . In the following, we assume to have fixed a stable fragment F = (Sˆ, Aˆ) of M !⊕, and C a set of
tuple contexts preserved by F .
Proposition 11 Let be R an ε-bisimulation on LF . Then R̂
C
is preserved by →C×∆(U ), ε-
bounding, and C -closed with respect to every t, s such that tR s.
Proof. • The fact that R̂C is C -closed is a direct consequence of the definition of lifting.
• The fact that it is ε-bounding is a direct consequence of the definition of a ε-bisimulation.
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E ::= [·] | EM
M ⊕ N ↪→M,N (λx.M)N ↪→M{x/N}
M ↪→ N1, . . . , Nn
E[M ]→ E[N1], . . . E[Nn]
Figure 10: One-step CBN Semantics
• It is preserved by →C×∆(U ): it is indeed guarantee by our definition of preservation of C by
F .

Proposition 12 Let F = (Sˆ, Aˆ) be a stable fragment of M !⊕, C a set of tuple contexts preserved
by F , and t, s ∈ SLF . Then δcC (t, s) ≤ δbLF (t, s).
Proof. Let be ε = δbLF (t, s). Let be R the biggest ε-bisimulation on LF . By lemma 3, it holds
that tR s. Using Proposition 11 and 5, we obtain that δcC ,!(t, s) ≤ ε, which is exactly the result. 
In the following, we make use of Proposition 12 on stable fragments corresponding to embeddings
of Λ⊕ into Λ!⊕. We will consider two different encodings depending on the underlying notion of
evaluation.
6.2 Call-by-Name
Λ⊕ can first of all be endowed with call-by-name semantics, as in Figure 10. We use it to define
an approximation semantics exactly in the same way as in Figure 1, and we take as usual the
semantics of a term to be the least upper bound of its approximated semantics. Moreover, we
denote by δccbn the context distance on Λ⊕, defined the natural way. We are going, in the remainder
of this section, to use our results about Λ!⊕ to obtain a characterization of δ
c
cbn.
6.2.1 The Call-By-Name Embedding
Girard’s translation [19] gives us an embedding 〈·〉cbn : Λ⊕ → Λ!⊕, defined as follows:
〈x〉cbn = x 〈λx.M〉cbn = λ!x.〈M〉cbn
〈MN〉cbn = 〈M〉cbn!〈N〉cbn 〈M ⊕ N〉cbn = 〈M〉cbn ⊕ 〈N〉cbn
Please observe that 〈·〉cbn respects typing, in the sense that, when we define σcbn = µα.!α( α ,
it holds that for every term M of Λ⊕ whose free variables are in {x1, . . . , xn}, we can show that
!x1 :!σ
cbn, . . . , !xn :!σ
cbn ` 〈M〉cbn : σcbn.
This definition allows us to have some useful properties:
Lemma 18 • Let be M,N ∈ Λ⊕, and z ∈X . Then 〈M{z/N}〉cbn = 〈M〉cbn{z/〈N〉cbn};
• Let be M a closed term in Λ⊕. Then 〈JMK〉cbn = J〈M〉cbnK.
• Let be M ∈ 〈Λ⊕〉cbn, such that there exists an evaluation context E, and N ∈ Λ⊕, verifying
〈M〉cbn = E[〈N〉cbn]. There for any term L ∈ Λ⊕, it holds that E[〈L〉cbn] ∈ 〈Λ⊕〉cbn.
6.2.2 Metrics for Λ⊕
It is very tempting to define a metric on Λ⊕ just as follows: δbcbn(M,N) = δ
b
!σcbn,!(!〈M〉cbn, !〈N〉cbn).
We can easily see that it is sound with respect to the context distance for Λ⊕, since any context
of this language can be seen, through 〈·〉cbn, as a context in Λ!⊕. However, it is not complete, as
shown by the following example:
Example 10 We consider M = Ω⊕ (λx.Ω) and N = (λx.Ω). We can see that δb!σcbn,!(!〈M〉cbn, !〈N〉cbn) =
1: indeed, when we define a sequence of Λ!⊕-contexts by Cn = λ!x. ((λy1. . . . λyn.(λz.zy1, . . . yn))x . . . x) [],
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A = ([] ,
[
!σcbn
]
) B = (
[
σcbn
]
, []) Cn = (
[
σcbn
]
, [σcbn, . . . , σcbn
n
])
(([],
[
!〈M〉cbn])
, A)
(([],
[
!〈N〉cbn])
, A)
((
[〈M〉cbn], [])
, B)
((
[〈N〉cbn], [])
, B)
((
[〈M〉cbn] ,
[λ!x.Ω!]), C1)
((
[〈N〉cbn] ,
[λ!x.Ω!]), C1)
((
[〈M〉cbn] ,
[λ!x.Ω!, . . . , λ!x.Ω!
n
]), Cn)
((
[〈N〉cbn] ,
[λ!x.Ω!, . . . , λ!x.Ω!
n
]), Cn)
. . .
. . .
(?1)
1
(?1)
1
(!1)
1
(!1)
1
2
(!1)
1
(!1)
1
2
Figure 11: A Fragment of M !⊕
A0 = ([σcbn], []) A1 = ([σcbn], [σcbn]) Uˆ cbn(M) = (([〈M〉cbn], []), A0)
SM cbn⊕ =
({
Uˆ cbn(M) |M ∈ Λ⊕
}
∪ {([〈M〉cbn], [〈V 〉cbn]), A1 |M ∈ Λ⊕, V ∈ Λ⊕ a normal form })⋂SM !⊕
J Vcbn =J
V ∩ {(E,F,σ, τ ,M, γ) , M ∈ 〈Λ⊕〉cbn}
AM cbn⊕ = {A1} × {@1κ | κ ∈J Vcbn} ∪ {A0} × A!
Figure 12: The Stable Fragment F cbn = (SM cbn⊕ ,AM cbn⊕ ).
we see that Obs(!〈M〉cbn) = 1/2n while Obs(!〈N〉cbn) = 1. But those contexts Cn have more expres-
sive power that any context in 〈Λ⊕〉cbn, since they do something that none of the context from Λ⊕
can do: they evaluate a copy of the term, and then shift their focus to another copy of the term. It
can be seen in the embedding: a term in 〈Λ⊕〉cbn has never several redexes in linear position. We
are now going to explicit this idea, and show that δccbn(M,N) =
1
2 < δ
b
cbn(M,N).
The way out consists in using the notion of stable fragment to refine the Markov Chain M !⊕ by
keeping only the states and actions we are interested in.
Definition 24 We define a stable fragment F cbn as specified in Figure 12, and a distance δcbn
on Λ⊕ as:
δcbn(M,N) = δ
b
LFcbn
(sˆcbn(M), sˆcbn(N)),
where sˆcbn(M) = ({([〈M〉cbn], [])1}, A0).
We need now to define a set of tuple contexts preserved byF cbn, the aim of applying Proposition
12.
Definition 25 Ccbn is the smallest set of tuple contexts such that:
• If M ∈ Λ⊕ with FV (M) ⊆ {x1}, then (〈M〉cbn, A0, σcbn) ∈ Ccbn;
• If (C,A0, σcbn) ∈ Ccbn, and C = E[x1], it holds that (E[y1], A1, σcbn) ∈ Ccbn.
Ccbn is designed to allow us to link δccbn and δ
c
Ccbn
.
Lemma 19 For M,N ∈ Λ⊕ closed terms, δccbn(M,N) = δcCcbn(sˆcbn(M), sˆcbn(N)).
Proof. The proof is based on Lemma 18. 
Lemma 20 Ccbn is preserved by the stable fragment F cbn.
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Proof. Let be (C,A, γ) ∈ Ccbn, and t a A-state in LFcbn . Using the definition of C , we may see
that γ = σcbn, and moreover we are in one of the following cases:
• Or A = A0, C = 〈M〉cbn with FV (M) ⊆ {x1} and t is of the form (D, A0), where D =∑
i∈N pi · {([〈N〉cbni ], [])
1}. Then we still have to consider separately two cases:
• or 〈M〉cbn = E[x1]. We take a = (?1). We can easily check that (A0, (?1)) ∈ AM cbn⊕
⋃
(T×
{τ}). Moreover, we see that there exists E such that (C, t) a→C×∆(U )E , and more precisely
E = {(E[y1], s)1} where s is a A1-state. Since (E[y1], A1, σcbn) ∈ Ccbn by construction, it
holds that S(E) ⊆ ⋃B∈T{(D, s) | s a B-state ∧ ∃η s.t. (D,B, η) ∈ Ccbn}, which shows the
result.
• or 〈M〉cbn = E[R], where R is a redex. We take a = τ , and we obtain the result by a similar
reasoning as the previous case.
• Or A = A1. Then t is of the form (D, A1), where D = ∑i∈N pi · ([〈N〉cbn], [〈V 〉cbn]). Moreover,
it implies that C = E[y1], and there exists L such that E[x1] = 〈L〉cbn. Looking at the cbn
encoding, we see that the only way to have E[x1] ∈ 〈Λ⊕〉cbn is E = F [[·]!〈P 〉cbn]. It means
that C = F [y1!〈P 〉cbn]. We take a = @1κ with κ = ({1}, {}, [σcbn], [σcbn], !〈P 〉cbn, σcbn). We can
easily check that (A1, a) ∈ AM cbn⊕
⋃
(T× {τ}). Moreover, we see that there exists E and s a
A1-state such that (C, t)
a→C×∆(U )E , and E = {(F [y1], s)1}. Using the third point of Lemma
18, and that F [x1!〈P 〉cbn] ∈ 〈Λ⊕〉cbn, we see that F [x1] ∈ 〈Λ⊕〉cbn. Looking at the definition of
Ccbn, we see that it means that (F [y1], A1, σcbn) ∈ Ccbn, and so we have the result.

Theorem 7 (Full Abstraction for CBN) δccbn and δcbn coincide.
Proof. We first show that δcbn is at least as discriminating δ
c
cbn. Let be M,N ∈ Λ⊕. By definition
of LFcbn , we know that sˆ
cbn(M), sˆcbn(N) ∈ SLFcbn . Moreover, we know by Lemma 20 that Ccbn
is preserved by F cbn. So we can apply Proposition 12, and we see that δcCcbn(sˆ
cbn(M), sˆcbn(N)) ≤
δcbn(M,N). Then, soundness follows using Lemma 19. When proving completeness part, we rely
on an “intrinsic” characterization of δcbn. The details can be found in the next section. 
6.2.3 An intrinsic trace characterization of δcbn
Looking at the structure of F cbn, we see that we can in fact give an intrinsic definition of δcbn,
without considering tuples and exponential constructs. In fact, every sequence of actions in LFcbn
can be see as an element of the set T cbnr defined by:
T ∈ T cbnr ::= > | M · T ,where M ∈ Λ⊕ and FV (M) ⊆ {x}.
We can now talk about the probability for a term M to effectuate a trace T defined by:
Prcbn(M,N1 . . . Nm · >) =
∑
JM(N1{x/M})...(Nm{x/M})K.
and we obtain a simple characterization of δcbn:
Proposition 13 Let be M,N ∈ Λ⊕. Then:
δcbn(M,N) = sup
{| Prcbn(M,T)− Prcbn(N,T) | with T ∈ T cbnr } .
Please observe that we can alternatively see traces as contexts. As a consequence, if we define
CIU-contexts in Λ⊕ as E = (λx.xM1 . . .Mn) []. We may express δcbn in a purely contextual way:
Proposition 14 Let be M,N ∈ Λ⊕. Then δcbn(M,N) = supE CIU context|
∑JE[M ]K −∑JE[N ]K|.
Please observe that Proposition 14 allows us to see easily that δcbn(M,N) ≤ δccbn(M,N). As such,
it allows us to do the completeness part of the proof Theorem 7.
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V = λx.M E ::= [·] | EV | ME.
M ⊕ N ↪→M,N (λx.M)V ↪→M{x/V }
M ↪→ N1, . . . , Nn
E[M ]→ E[N1], . . . E[Nn]
Figure 13: One-step CBV Semantics
6.3 Call-by-Value
In a similar way, we can endow Λ⊕ with a call-by-value semantics, and embedd it into Λ!⊕. We
are then able to define a suitable fragment of M !⊕, a suitable set of tuple contexts preserving it,
and a caracterisation of a call-by-value context distance for Λ⊕ follows. While the construction
of the stable fragment (and the set of tuple contexts to consider) are more involved than in the
call-by-name case, we noticed that the caracterisation we obtain seem to have some similarities
with the way environmental bisimulation for a CBV probabilistic λ-calculus was defined in [33]. In
this section, we endow Λ⊕ with a call-by-value semantics, as specified in Figure 13. We denote δccbv
the contextual metric on Λ⊕ induced by this semantics. We define a new embedding: Λ⊕ → Λ!⊕,
which respects the CBV semantics, as:
〈x〉cbv =!x 〈λx.M〉cbv =!λ!x.〈M〉cbv
〈MN〉cbv = (λ!x.x〈N〉cbv)〈M〉cbv 〈M ⊕ N〉cbv = 〈M〉cbv ⊕ 〈N〉cbv
We define σcbv as the following type : σcbv = µα.!(α( α). We define τ cbv = σcbv ( σcbv:
it verifies σcbv =A !τ cbv. For any term M ∈ Λ⊕, if FV (M) = {z1, . . . , zn} it holds that (!zi :
σcbv)1≤i≤n ` 〈M〉cbv : σcbv.
We will use later the following nice property of the encoding:
Lemma 21 Let be M and N in Λ⊕, and z a free variable of M . Then 〈M〉cbv{z/λ!z.〈N〉cbv} ∈
〈Λ⊕〉cbv.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the form of M . 
Lemma 22 Let be M ∈ Λ⊕. Then for any V ∈ S(J〈M〉cbvK), it holds that V ∈ 〈Λ⊕〉cbv.
Proof. The proof uses Lemma 21. 
Again, we are now going to define a stable fragment of M !⊕. However, contrary to the call-
by-name case, it does not contain the full call-by-value encoding Λ⊕. It actually contains only
the encoding of values in Λ⊕, which allows us to have a more tractable characterization. We
are able to treat the general case simply by noting that for any term M and N , it holds that
δccbv(M,N) = δ
c
cbv(λz.M, λz.N).
Definition 26 We define a fragment F cbv = (SM cbv⊕ ,AM cbv⊕ ) as specified in Figure 14, and a
metric δcbv on Λ⊕ specified by:
δcbv(M,N) = δ
b
LFcbv
(sˆσcbv(!〈λx.M〉cbv), sˆσcbv(!〈λx.N〉cbv)).
Please observe that contrary to the cbn-case, we do not need to restrict action by considering the
type of states.
Proposition 15 F cbv is a stable fragment of M !⊕.
Proof. Let be (K,A) ∈ SM cbv⊕ . Since (K,A) is in SM cbv⊕ , there exist ϕ, and M ,N ,L respectively
n,m, p term sequences, such that K = (λ!x.M , λ!x.N ; !(λ!x.L)ϕ) and A = A
ϕ
n,(m,p). Let be a
such that (A, a) ∈ AM cbv⊕ . Let be s = (H,B) such that PM !⊕(t, a, s) > 0. We want to show that
s ∈ SM cbv⊕ . We distinguish cases depending on a.
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Aϕn,(m,p) = ([(τ
cbv)
n
], [(τ cbv)
m
, (!τ cbv)
p
])ϕ J
V
cbv =J
V ∩ {(E,F,σ, τ ,M, σcbv) , M ∈ 〈Λ⊕〉cbv}
SM cbv⊕ =
{
(([λ!x.M ], [λ!x.N , !(λ!x.L)]ϕ), A
ϕ
n,(m,p))
where M ,N ,L are n,m, p-sequences in〈Λ⊕〉cbv, and ∀i,Ni ∈M
}⋂SM !⊕
AM cbv⊕ = T× (
({@iκ with κ ∈J Vcbv} ∩ A@) ∪ AM !⊕ ∪ A!)
Figure 14: The Stable Fragment F cbv = (SM cbv⊕ ,AM cbv⊕ ).
• Or a = (!i). It implies that H = (λ!x.M , λ!x.N ; !(λ!x.L)ϕ;V ) with ` V : σcbv and
B = ([(τ cbv)
n
], [(τ cbv)
m
, (!τ cbv)
p
]ϕ, σ
cbv). Since V is obtained by the evaluation of a
term in 〈Λ⊕〉cbv, it is also in 〈Λ⊕〉cbv. It allows us to see that V is of the form !λ!x.P .
So we see that we can construct a permutation ψ from {1, . . . ,m + p + 1} such that
s = ((λ!x.M , λ!x.N ; !(λ!x.(L;P ))ψ)), and B = ([(τ
cbv)
n
], [(τ cbv)
m
, (!τ cbv)
p+1
]ψ). As a
consequence, s ∈ SM cbv⊕ .
• Or a = (?i). It implies that H = (λ!x.(M ;Lj), λ!x.N ; !(λ!x.L{1,...,p}\{j})ϕremove({j})), when
ϕ(m + j) = i, and B = ([(τ cbv)
n+1
], [(τ cbv)
m
, (!τ cbv)
p−1
]ϕremove({j})). So we can see that
s ∈ SM cbv⊕ .
• Or a = @iκ with κ ∈ J Vcbv. Then κ = (E,F,σ, τ ,M, σcbv) and M is an open value in
〈Λ⊕〉cbv. Since there exist s such that PM !⊕(t, a, s) > 0, it means that E ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, and
F ⊆ {1, . . .m+ p}, and moreover (σ, τ ) is one of the Am,n,pϕ . verifying 1 ≤ ϕ(i) ≤ m (that
is, τ i = τ
cbv ( τ cbv). By a similar reasoning as previous cases, we can see that s ∈ SM cbv⊕ .

Please observe that for any term M ∈ Λ⊕, the associated state sˆσcbv(〈λz.M〉cbv) is in SM cbv⊕ .
As in the previous section, we define a suitable set Ccbv of tuple contexts preserving F cbv, in
order to apply Proposition 12.
Definition 27 We define a set of tuple contexts Ccbv as those of the form (C1 . . . CkD, (σ, τ ), σcbv)
such that:
• Ci ∈ {yj | τj = σcbv( σcbv} ∪ {λ!z.z〈M〉cbv | z 6∈ FV (M)} ∪ λ!z.〈Λ⊕〉cbv ∪ {xj}
• D ∈ 〈Λ⊕〉cbv ∪ {yj | τj =!(σcbv( σcbv)} ∪ {xj}
Proposition 16 Ccbv is preserved by F cbv.
Proof. Let be (C,A, γ) ∈ Ccbv. Let be a such that (A, a) ∈ AM cbv⊕ . Let be t a A-state t in
SLFcbv .Let be E such that (C, t)
a→C×∆(U )E . Let be h ∈ S(E). We note h = (F, s), and B the
tuple type such that s is a B-state. We have to show that (F,B, σcbv) ∈ Ccbv.
Please observe that there exists actually only one a such that (C, t)
a→C×∆(U ), and it depends
only on C. Consequently, we do the proof by considering separately the different form of C. We
know, by definition of Ccbv, that C is of the form C1 . . . CkD.
• If one of the Ci is of the form xj , we consider the smallest index i for which it happens. Then
a = (!i), and F = C1, . . . , !yn+1, . . . CnD.
• Otherwise, C1 . . . Ck[·] is an evaluation context. Then:
– IfD = xi. We have that a = (!
i). It follows that t
a→C×∆(U )s, and F = C1, . . . , Ckym+p+1.
So we can see that the result holds.
– If D = yj , with τj =!τ
cbv. Then it holds that a = (?i)., and F = C1, . . . , Ck!xn+1.
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– If D is in 〈Λ⊕〉cbv. We show the result by induction on the term L such that D = 〈L〉cbv.
∗ OrD = 〈M ⊕N〉cbv. Then a = τ , and F = C1, . . . , CkG, withG ∈ {〈M〉cbv, 〈N〉cbv} ⊆
〈Λ⊕〉cbv and so the result holds.
∗ Or D = 〈MN〉cbv. Then D = (λ!z.z〈N〉cbv)〈M〉cbv. We can take G = 〈M〉cbv,
Cn+1 = (λ!z.z〈N〉cbv), and we can see that C = C1, . . . , Cn+1G, and so we can
apply the induction hypothesis to G = 〈M〉cbv.
∗ If D is an open value. It means that D =!λ!z.〈M〉cbv, or D =!xi. Please observe
that Cn is always an open value (by construction). It means that the redex CnD is
going to be reduced.
· If Cn = yj , with τj = σcbv ( σcbv, then a = @jκ, where κ = (E,F,σ, τ , D, σcbv),
where E ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, and !xE :!σE ,yF : τF ` D : σcbv and we see that indeed
κ ∈ J Vcbv. Moreover, if we note q the cardinality of E, we can see that
F = C1, . . . , Cn−1yn+1−q+1. As a consequence, we have the result.
· If Cn = λ!z.(z〈N〉cbv). Then a = τ . Please observe that we can define
Cn+1 such that !Cn+1 = D. Now, please observe that we should have F =
C1, . . . , Cn−1Cn+1〈N〉cbv, and so the result holds.
· If Cn = λ!z.(〈N〉cbv). Then ifD =!xi, we have that F = C1, . . . , Cn−1〈M{z/xi}〉cbv,
and we have the result. Similarly, if D =!λ!z.〈M〉cbv, it holds that F =
C1, . . . , Cn−1〈M{z/λ!z.〈M〉cbv}〉cbv. We use Lemma 21 to obtain the result.

Definition 28 We define a metric δcbv on Λ⊕ by: δcbv(M,N) = δbLFcbv (sˆσcbv(!〈λx.M〉
cbv), sˆσcbv(!〈λx.N〉cbv)).
Theorem 8 (Full Abstraction for CBV) δccbv and δ
b
cbv coincide.
The proof can be found in [6]. Again, soundness is based on Proposition 12, while completeness
relies on yet another characterization of the context distance.
6.3.1 Intrinsic characterization
We don’t have an intrinsic characterization as simpler as in the cbn case. However, we can express
the distance δccbv using a LMC M
cbv
⊕ , designed to be a simplified and untyped version of M
!
⊕, and
that doesn’t use the embedding.
Definition 29 We define a labelled Markov chain M cbv⊕ = (S
cbv
⊕ ,A
cbv
⊕ ,P
cbv
⊕ ), where:
• S cbv⊕ = {(V , n) | V a n-sequence of values}
• A cbv⊕ = {@Mi | ∃k ∈ N, M = xk or L = λz.M}
• Pcbv⊕ is defined in Figure 15.
As for Λ!⊕, we transform the LMC M
cbv
⊕ into a purely non-deterministic WLTS. We define
L cbv⊕ = (SL cbv⊕ ,AL cbv⊕ ,
·→, w), where:
• The set of states is SL cbv⊕ =
⋃
n∈N (Distr({V | V a n-sequence })× {n})
• The set of actions is AL cbv⊕ = A cbv⊕ ∪ N,
• The transition function ·→ is defined as follows:
(D, n) n→(D, n)
(D, n) a→
∑
V
D(V ) · PM !⊕((V , n))(a),
• The weight w is such that w(D, n) = ∑D.
Please remember that we give in Section 5.3 a definition of the trace metric δbL for any WLTS. We
can apply it to L cbv⊕ , and it gives us a characterization of δcbv.
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(λz.M , n)
M a n− sequence (λz.M ;W,n+ 1)
@iV
FV (V ) ⊆ {x1, . . . , xn}JMi{z/V {x/λz.M}}K(W )
Figure 15: Definition of M cbv⊕
Proposition 17 Let be M,N ∈ Λ⊕. Then:
δbL (([λx.M ], 1), ([λx.N ], 1)) = δcbv(M,N).
7 Related Work
This is definitely not the first work on metrics in the context of programming languages semantics.
A very nice introduction to the topic, together with a comprehensive (although outdated) list of
references can be found in [36]. One of the many uses of metrics is as an alternative to order-
theoretic semantics. This has also been applied to higher-order languages, and to deterministic
PCF [15].
If one focuses on probabilistic programming languages, the first attempts at using metrics as a
way to measure “how far” two programs are, algebraically or behaviourally, are due to Giacalone et
al. [18], and Desharnais et al. [11, 12], who both consider process algebras in the style of Milner’s
CCS. Most of further work in this direction has focused on concurrent specifications. Among
the recent advances in this direction (and without any hope of being comprehensive), we can
cite Gebler et al.’s work on uniform continuity as a way to enforce compositionality in metric
reasoning [17, 16].
Finally, great inspiration for this work came from the many contributions on metrics for labelled
Markov chains and processes appeared in the last twenty years (e.g. [37, 13]).
8 Conclusions
We have shown how the context distance can be characterized so as to simplify concrete proofs, and
to which extent this metric trivializes. All this has been done in a universal linear λ-calculus for
probabilistic computation. This clarifies to which extent refining equivalences into metrics is worth
in such a scenario. The tuple-based techniques in Section 5.6 are potentially very interesting in
view of possible applications to cryptography, as hinted in [4]. This is indeed what we are working
on currently.
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